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I. INTRODUCTION
Long term care—assistance when we are elderly, frail, or have a
disability—is a basic human need.
Families, the private market,
communities, and the state all play roles in ensuring that these essential
needs—help with bathing, eating, transportation, self-care, and
housekeeping, not to mention companionship and belonging—are met.
There is nothing natural about the allocation of responsibility for care.
Roles differ from place to place, and change over time. Who manages
decisions about care reveals, for example, whether members of a society
perceive that a frail elderly person or a person with disabilities is capable of
being autonomous. Who bears the benefits and burdens of care illuminates
the role and nature of the family, including gendered dynamics within
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households and intergenerational compacts between households. How we
compensate and regulate caretakers who work inside our homes, or how
we compensate members of our families who provide care, illustrates how
and whether we believe that home and market operate under distinct rules,
even when the boundaries between them prove to be porous.
The past thirty years in the United States have brought remarkable
transformations in the organization of long term care. Although female
family members still provide the lion’s share of long term care in this
country, the government has gradually taken an increasing role in providing
long term care for the frail elderly and persons with disabilities.1 Like
other forms of public assistance, the form of help from the state has
changed over time, reflecting shifting notions about the best method for
delivering services given limited resources, as well as the evolution of
American society itself. Initially, the Medicaid program, the largest public
funder of long term care, paid only for institutional care, such as nursing
homes or hospitals. By the early 1980s, advocates began to demand that
Medicaid provide some long term care services in peoples’ homes, so that
they could age in place or live independently. Most recently, State
Medicaid Programs have been experimenting with a model of “consumer
direction,” a voucher program in which beneficiaries use government funds
to purchase long term care assistance on the private market.2 One
fascinating aspect of consumer direction is that beneficiaries tend to hire
family members to provide care, thus returning the family back to the
center of the discussion, albeit this time in the context of a free marketdriven program funded by the state.
I argue that while the new trend towards consumer direction in long term
care has some benefits, it also creates significant negative consequences
that advocates and policy makers should be attentive to before this service
delivery model becomes more widespread. I begin the article in Section II
by describing how the consumer directed model, which has been heavily
1. Not all persons who are elderly or who have disabilities require long term care.
For the purposes of this article, I am referring to those who do require some form of
long term care. The term “persons with disabilities” encompasses children with special
needs, non-elderly adults with disabilities, elderly persons with disabilities, and the
frail elderly. Of course, the needs of each of these communities (and indeed of
individuals within those communities) are diverse.
2. I use the term “consumer directed long term care” in this article to denote
government funded programs in which the beneficiary has both employer authority (the
power to hire and fire their aides) and budget authority (the power to allocate some of
his or her stipend towards goods and services, according to a preapproved plan). See
generally Pamela Doty et al., New State Strategies to Meet Long Term Care Needs, 29
HEALTH AFF. 49, 50 (2010) (describing states’ efforts to implement various long-term
care programs). There are multiple terms for similar kinds of programs, which include
“Cash and Counseling,” “self-directed long term care,” “person-directed long term
care,” “consumer-directed personal care assistance services” (“CD-PAS”), and
“individualized care,” among others.
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influenced by both neoliberal economic theory and progressive human
rights discourse, emerged in response to two concrete problems in the long
term care delivery system: dissatisfaction with services and a severe labor
shortage. Beneficiaries in the Medicaid funded in-home care programs
complained that they lacked autonomy because a Medicaid Home Health
Agency controlled the hiring, firing, training, and scheduling of the aides
they rely upon. Further, many agencies could not find adequate staff to
provide high quality, culturally appropriate care. These problems are
significant enough that they are a matter of public concern. The current
labor shortage of in-home care workers will grow more acute in the near
future. The Census Bureau estimates that the number of older persons in
the United States will increase from 35 million people to 87 million people
between 2000 and 2050.3 Geographic mobility and the need for most
women to work outside of the home make it increasingly difficult for
family members to provide unpaid care. Because Medicaid is a federal
government program, undocumented immigrant labor cannot supplement
the regularized labor force, as occurs in private pay situations.
Consumer directed long term care programs address the question of
autonomy by transforming “beneficiaries” into “consumers” who may use
their funds to hire any worker to care for them. Consumer direction
transforms the passive Medicaid beneficiary into an active consumer who
will carefully manage her limited benefit as though it were private
property. Simultaneously, state funding of consumer directed long term
care might also be seen as an entitlement to services that maximize the selfdetermination of people with disabilities.
Consumer direction addresses the shortage of labor by opening up new
labor pools. Consumers can tap into the labor of friends and family
members who are not career caretakers but are willing to work caring for
someone they know. Many, if not most, consumers hire family members
with their stipends. The significance of this, which I explore in detail in
Section III, should not be understated: consumer directed long term care is
the first potentially large scale, state-funded commodification of family
care work in the United States.
At the core of this article is Section IV, in which I ask what happens
when the rhetoric of the “autonomy of the individual,” which generates
much of the political support for this program, meets the reality of the
commodification of family labor, in the context of a state program under
pressure to contain costs. I argue that the autonomy arguments underlying
3. See RICHARD W. JOHNSON ET AL., MEETING THE LONG TERM CARE NEEDS OF
THE BABY BOOMERS: HOW CHANGING FAMILIES WILL AFFECT PAID HELPERS AND
INSTITUTIONS,
URBAN
INSTITUTE
1
(2007),
available
at

www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311451_Meeting_Care.pdf
growth using 2004 U.S. Census figures).
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support for consumer directed long term care from both political
conservatives and liberals mask how decisions that we make about long
term care affect our family members, our care workers, and our
communities in concrete and immediate ways. When the beneficiary and
the worker are likely to be family members, and may even be part of the
same nuclear household, it is misleading to consider only individual
autonomy. In the aggregate, decisions about long term care policy
determine the shape of our society—and have significant effects on gender,
race, and class-based inequalities. From this vantage point, I see Medicaid
long term care policy as a site of governance of both the family and the
market; while it appears in the form of a public benefit, it shapes the legal
regulation and norms of family life in particular ways, structures
employment, remuneration and work around specific principles, and has
consequences that reach far beyond the intimate relation between the
caretaker and care receiver.4
I argue that while that consumer direction has tangible benefits, shifting
employer authority to the beneficiary in while simultaneously
commodifying family labor also has specific negative consequences,
several of which I discuss in detail. A focus on autonomy as consumer
choice is rooted in the assumption that people may be disembedded from
their families and that pitting the interest of the consumer-as-employer
against that of the family-member-as-worker is possible, and would not
have a negative effect on the relationship. In the meantime, the state sheds
its obligations as a regulator of quality of care and no longer has to provide
for even the most basic labor and employment benefits or protections for
the workers. Consumer directed long term care reduces workplace
protections for people who work in private homes—rather than for an
agency-based employer—and for employees who are family members.
These reduced workplace protections dislodge the workers from their
position in the regularized labor force. This leaves already vulnerable
workers, who are disproportionately low-wage earning women of color, in
an even more precarious position than before. The focus on autonomy as a
positive human right, while a vital component of the movement for rights
for persons with disabilities, blinds us to effects on the capabilities and
rights of the paraprofessional and family care workers. By scattering
employer authority across all consumers, consumer direction undermines

4. See Janet Halley and Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family
Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 753 (2010). Long term care policy functions as an aspect of “Family Law 2”
(legal regulation of the family outside of the laws of matrimony, divorce and custody,
which often reinforce the family as special or exceptional) as well as “Family Law 3”
(those laws which operate in deep background to how family lives are structured and
experienced). See id.
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the nascent attempts by long term care workers to bargain collectively for
better pay and improved working conditions and benefits. The option to
provide care for a family member who is elderly or who has a disability,
while possibly the best option in the short term, poses significant long term
opportunity costs for the disproportionately female family member
caretakers who are not participating in the regular labor force.
In the final section of this article, I take up the question of how to
conceptualize a program that honors the dignity and self-determination of
persons with disabilities, while not imagining them as mere market
participants who are disembedded from their families and communities.
Instead of focusing on autonomy, I propose a lens of “community
resilience” to design and evaluate programs for long term care. The role of
the state should be to build the resilience of these caretaking communities
by ensuring workplace protections for all workers, connecting caretaking
units to each other and to outside services so that they are not providing
care in isolation, and finally, remaking communities so that they
understand caretaking and supporting the elderly and people with
disabilities as part of community life, rather than an individual undertaking.
II. BACKGROUND: MEDICAID AND LONG TERM CARE
This article is about consumer directed long term care within the
Medicaid program. Consumer directed options within Medicaid are only a
small part of the much larger patchwork of the efforts of multiple actors to
meet the needs of the frail elderly and persons with disabilities.5 In this
section, I will give a cursory overview of long term care in the United
States and introduce the new consumer directed long term care option
under the Medicaid program.
A. What and Where is Long Term Care?
“Long term care” is an umbrella term for services to meet the medical
and non-medical needs of people who, due to advanced age or disability,
cannot care for themselves. Long term care commonly consists of
assistance with either or both the “activities of daily living” and the
“instrumental activities of daily living.”6 It takes place in institutional
5. There is no single system for long term care in the United States, no single
government agency that oversees long term care, and no universal entitlement to ensure
that everyone has the long term care they need. See generally Terence Ng et al.,
Medicare and Medicaid in Long-Term Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 22, 26 (2010) (describing
several of the programs that provide funding for long term care in the United States and
the lack of coordination among them).
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING LONG-TERM CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 2
box1.1 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/54xx/doc5400/04-26LongTermCare.pdf (defining long term care). Activities of daily living are basic
physical abilities, such as “eating, getting in and out of bed, getting around inside the

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/8

6

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Kraiem: Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy, Commodif

2011]

CONSUMER DIRECTION IN MEDICAID LONG TERM CARE

677

settings, such as nursing homes. It also occurs in private homes, or
wherever people live.
Home-based long term care can range from basic assistance with
remembering medications to bathing, dressing, feeding, basic medical care
(such as changing bandages, monitoring health, etc.), more complex
medical care (catheters, injections, etc.), and providing transportation. Of
course, the needs of the elderly and persons with disabilities are diverse.
Even the needs of individuals are not static.7 Each recipient of care is
differently situated and empowered with regard to age, race, ethnicity,
class, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, and other social
structures.8 These factors influence where, how, and from whom people
receive long term care.9
There are four major sources of funding for long term care: out of pocket
expenditures,10 long term care insurance,11 unremunerated care by family;
and public funding. Only nine percent of people have long term care
insurance policies, and paying out of pocket for full time long term care

home, dressing, bathing and using the toilet.” Id. “Instrumental activities of daily
living” are the functions necessary for living independently, such as “heavy housework
and laundry, preparing meals, shopping for groceries, getting around outside, getting to
places that require either driving or taking public transportation, managing money,
using the telephone, and taking medications.” Id.
7. Most people use a variety of long term care services over time as their need for
care changes. Care needs may increase over time, as a person ages and becomes
increasingly frail. Conversely, care needs may decrease, especially for children or nonelderly adults with disabilities, as they learn new skills or acquire home modifications
or assistive technologies that make independent living more feasible. See id. at 13-14;
see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 3.
8. See Nancy R. Hooyman & Judith G. Gonyea, A Feminist Model of Family
Care: Practice and Policy Directions, 11 J. WOMEN & AGING 149, 153 (1999).
9. For example, women tend to outlive men and remain healthier for longer.
Thus, even women who were once married are less likely to receive long term care
from a spouse in their own homes than men who are similarly situated with regard to
race or class. A woman may provide long term care for her husband, who is likely to
die before she does. She then must rely upon others (usually female adult children) for
her long term care. See id. at 150.
10. People with disabilities or their families pay for approximately $45 billion in
long term care services, including nursing homes and home-based care. This amounts
to twenty-seven percent of long term care costs “out of pocket.” Richard W. Johnson,
The Strains and Drains of Long-Term Care, 10 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 397, 398
(2008).
11. Approximately nine percent of Americans above the age of 55 have private
long term care insurance. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 2. In 2004, private
insurance covered about $6 billion, or four percent, of long term care expenses. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at 4. Insured persons often find that insurance is
inadequate to cover expenses. See id. Uncertainty about insurer solvency and
premium instability, as well as other problems in the long term care insurance market,
make purchasing insurance unattractive to many consumers. See id. at 17-21. The
availability of government-funded long term care through the Medicaid program also
renders long term care insurance less attractive, especially for people of modest means.
See id.
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over many years is unrealistic for most people.12 This means that the two
primary sources of long term care funding are public funding and
unremunerated care by families.
Long term care is labor intensive, which means that it is costly, even if
the workers are not paid at all or if the workers’ wages are low.13 For
example, a nursing home costs five to eight thousand dollars per month.14
In-home long term care is generally less expensive, but varies with the
needs of the recipient and does not account for the cost of room and board.
In 2004, Americans spent $135 billion on long term care for older adults15
and $206.6 billion on adults with disabilities in 2005.16 In addition,
families provide the equivalent of around $375 billion in unremunerated
care per year.17
B. The Need for Long Term Care Will Increase Dramatically in the Future
Often termed a “crisis,” the increasing needs of the large baby boomer
generation as they age will drive up demand for long term care services.18
The number of older persons in the United States will increase from 35
million people to 87 million people between 2000 and 2050.19 The number
of people over 85, who typically require the most long term care resources,
12. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
13. See CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING AND THE

LONG-TERM CARE WORKFORCE CRISIS: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 1, 3, 7 (2002),
available at http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/CLTC_doc_rev1.pdf
(noting that the relationship between public funding levels, wages and the quality of
long term care is complex).
14. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR
DISABLED CLIENT § 14.01[1] (2d ed. 2009).
15. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 6, at ix (estimating that approximately
$15,000 was spent per “impaired senior”).
16. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PAYING FOR LONG TERM CARE:
OVERVIEW
(2010),
available
at
http://www.longtermcare.gov/LTC/
Main_Site/Paying_LTC/Costs_Of_Care/Costs_Of_Care.aspx (last visited July 30,
2010) (explaining that this number excludes the cost of care provided by family and
friends).
17. See Carol Levine et al., Bridging Troubled Waters: Family Caregivers,
Transitions, and Long-Term Care, 29 HEALTH AFF. 116, 116 (2010) (estimating that
“thirty-four million family caregivers, the majority of them women, provide seventyfive to eighty percent of long-term care in the community”).
18. See generally KATHRYN G. ALLEN, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-05564T, LONG TERM CARE FINANCING: GROWING DEMAND AND LOSS OF SERVICES ARE
STRAINING FEDERAL AND STATE BUDGETS 12 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05564t.pdf (estimating that the number of people
relying on Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security will double by 2040); DAVID M.
WALKER, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-544T, LONG TERM CARE: AGING
BABY BOOM GENERATION WILL INCREASE DEMAND AND BURDEN ON STATE BUDGETS
10 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02544t.pdf (detailing the
economic challenges associated with the aging of 76 million baby boomers).
19. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/8

8

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Kraiem: Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy, Commodif

2011]

CONSUMER DIRECTION IN MEDICAID LONG TERM CARE

679

will quadruple between 2000 and 2050, rising from 4 million to almost 21
million people.20 Even in fairly conservative estimates, which assume a
steady and substantial decline in levels of disability among the elderly, “the
number of older adults using paid home care will increase by three-fourths
between 2000 and 2040 and the number in nursing homes will increase by
two-thirds.”21 Non-elderly persons with disabilities are also using personal
assistance services at an increased rate.22
C. Families Cannot Sustain the Current Levels of Unremunerated Care
The demographics of the baby boom do not tell the entire story. There is
also an increased need for state funded long term care because female
family members appear to be unable to sustain, much less increase, the
high levels of long term care they already provide.23 By far, the most
significant sources of long term care for people with disabilities in all
stages of life are their families. Some researchers estimate that family
caretakers provide almost eighty percent of all long term care in the United
States.24 A quarter of all workers report that they care for an ailing
parent.25 The amount of work required to care for family members can be
considerable. Seventeen percent of family caretakers report that they
provide care for forty hours per week or more.26
The other part of this story is rooted in the immense transformation of
the work and home lives of women in the United States over the past half
century, just as life expectancy is rising and creating an increased demand
for long term care. Both men and women provide unpaid family care.27
20. See id.; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. INTERIM PROJECTIONS BY AGE, SEX, RACE

HISPANIC
ORIGIN
tbl.2a,
available
at
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/usinterimproj/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). While not
all of the elderly are disabled, sixty-nine percent of those who are 65 or older will
develop disabilities before they die, and thirty-five percent of those are expected to
enter a nursing home. Peter Kemper et al., Long-Term Care over an Uncertain Future:
What Can Current Retirees Expect?, 42 INQUIRY 335, 342 (2005).
21. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
22. See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., THE PERSONAL ASSISTANCE
SERVICES AND DIRECT-SUPPORT WORKFORCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW 3 (2003),
available
at
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/
CMS_Lit_Rev_FINAL_6.12.03.pdf. (suggesting that the need for home health care
will increase as the number of young people with disabilities grows).
23. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 6.
24. See LEE THOMPSON, LONG-TERM CARE FIN. PROJECT AT GEORGETOWN UNIV.,
LONG-TERM CARE: SUPPORT FOR FAMILY CAREGIVERS [ISSUE BRIEF] (2004), available
at http://ltc.georgetown.edu/pdfs/caregivers.pdf.
25. NANCY FOLBRE, INVISIBLE HEART 37 (2001).
26. See NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR CAREGIVING & AARP, CAREGIVING IN THE U.S. 44
fig.20 (2004), available at http://www.caregiving.org/data/04finalreport.pdf.
27. See METLIFE, THE METLIFE STUDY OF WORKING CAREGIVERS AND EMPLOYER
HEALTH
CARE
COSTS
10
(2010),
available
at
http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/2010/mmi-workingAND
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However, women provide the vast majority of unpaid care, and using the
term “family” caretakers masks the fact that women experience the
negative financial and emotional effects of caretaking more than men.28
Without discounting the extraordinary contributions many male caretakers
make to caring for family members, it is safe to say that wives, mothers,
and female adult children provide most unpaid home care for adults with
disabilities.29 Parents, largely mothers, provide unpaid family care for
children with disabilities.30 The gendered nature of the work is in part the
result of the fact that women appear to provide more care related to
immediate physical needs that cannot be scheduled at the convenience of
the caretaker, such as feeding and dressing, while men engage in other
important, but less time-bound tasks such as home maintenance, financial
planning, and providing transportation.31 Elderly women, who are more
likely to rely upon a non-spouse for care, might also prefer that intimate
tasks, such as bathing, be performed by a female family caretaker.
Researchers have found that “the demand for paid services will likely
rise in the future as the opportunity cost of care from adult children—
especially daughters—grows.”32 The fact that most women now work
outside of the home, either by choice or economic necessity, limits the
amount of unpaid labor that is available.33 Unremunerated (largely female)
caretakers become “derivative dependents.”34 A person who spends her
time providing care for another person instead of earning money must find
another source of support.35 But relying upon a mate for support during a
period of derivative dependency is less and less possible, as most families
require two incomes to maintain a middle class standard of living.36 Wage
caregivers-employers-health-care-costs.pdf. See also Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note
8, at 153.
28. See Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 150; FOLBRE, supra note 25, at 37.
29. See JEANNETTE TAKAMURA & BOB WILLIAMS, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., INFORMAL CAREGIVING: COMPASSION IN ACTION 5 (1998), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datcp/Reports/carebro2.pdf.
30. See EXEC. SUMMARY AND ACTION PLAN—SLOAN WORK AND FAMILY
RESEARCH NETWORK PANEL MEETING AT BOSTON COLLEGE: WORK-FAMILY ISSUES
FOR EMPLOYED PARENTS OF CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES 3, available at
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/pdfs/Disability_Panel_Summary_0908.pdf (last visited Nov. 3,
2010) [hereinafter SLOAN WORK AND FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK PANEL MEETING].
31. See Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 152. This tendency should not be
naturalized, but rather understood as the product of multiple factors, including the
gendered structure of the workforce, societal and cultural expectations based on gender,
state policies that shape family life and other forces. See id.
32. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 7.
33. Id.
34. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 41-45 (2005) (describing the
gendered nature of derivative dependency).
35. See id. at 46.
36. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING
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stagnation over the long term has meant that families do not have the
resilience to tolerate long periods of time with only one income.37 This is
even more acute for single earner households, which simply do not have
the option of trading paid work for unpaid care work.38 Even if this were
not an issue, people are more geographically mobile than they used to be,
which means that many people do not live close to the family members
who require help.39
D. Medicaid, the Largest Funder of Long Term Care, is Moving Towards
Consumer Directed Long Term Care Because of Autonomy Concerns and a
Shortage of Labor
State and federal governments together provide the largest share of cash
funds for long term care. When an individual does not have personal
resources, sufficient unpaid family care or insurance to cover long term
care needs, Medicaid is the payer of last resort.40 Medicaid pays for at least
one half of all nursing home care in the country.41 This is a significant
expenditure; one third of all state and federal Medicaid funds are spent on
long term care.42
Medicaid is a means-tested program with complex funding and
eligibility rules.43 In general terms, Medicaid recipients are poor.44
OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM 208-24 (1992) (arguing that growing
wealth inequalities mean that wage earners will suffer declining standards of living);
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP: WHY
MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 1-14 (2003) (arguing that
family incomes are almost entirely committed to necessities, such as home and car
payments, health insurance, and education costs).
37. See Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 155.
38. Id. at 156.
39. FOLBRE, supra note 25, at 37.
40. It is worth noting that Medicare (as opposed to Medicaid) does not, strictly
speaking, pay for long term care. Medicare will pay for a limited amount of skilled
care after a hospital discharge, including some home care. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m)
(2006) (stating that home health services include part time nursing care, physical or
occupational therapy, and home health aides that do not visit more than eight hours a
day or a total of 28 hours a week). However, this generally does not include personal
care services (such as cooking or transportation) and is often only available while there
is a need for skilled care (meaning the types of services provided by a professional
nurse) and not the care that a family member or paraprofessional could provide. While
Medicare has become a de facto long term care program for some people, it is not a
program that individuals can plan on using to fund their care.
41. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, § 14.01[1].
42. BRIAN BURWELL ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE
EXPENDITURES
IN
FY
2005
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=311451.
43. See generally FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, §§ 13.02, 13.03[1]-[4] (noting
that eligibility for benefits is restricted to persons with non-welfare income below a
certain level). Federal and state governments jointly fund the program. Id. § 14.01.
While state rules regarding Medicaid eligibility vary widely, recipients fall into several
general categories. The first are people deemed “categorically needy.” The
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Millions of Americans, even those who have not previously been lowincome, are deemed eligible for the program because of the costs
associated with long term care.45
Because it is such a large funder of long term care, Medicaid rules and
policies affect millions of the elderly and persons with disabilities. Up
until the early 1980s, Medicaid would pay for institutional long term care,
which meant that most people who required state subsidized long term care
wound up in nursing homes, institutions, or other congregate care living
facilities.46 Not all people with disabilities needed or wanted to live in
institutions, and it is an extremely expensive option.47
To combat institutional bias as well as save significant funds, some
states now offer Medicaid Home and Community Based Services
(“HCBS”), which can be thought of as nursing home diversion programs
under a federal waiver.48 HCBS programs vary from state to state, but
categorically needy are extremely poor and have an additional qualifying condition,
such as age, blindness, or other disability. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006); see 42 C.F.R. §
435.4 (2010) (defining categorically needy individuals as “families and children, aged,
blind, or disabled individuals, and pregnant women . . . who are eligible for
Medicaid”). The federal government requires states that participate in the Medicaid
program (which is all states at this time) to cover the categorically needy. 42 C.F.R. §
435.4. The second category are the “optional categorically needy,” which includes
people who might not otherwise qualify for coverage, but whom the state elects to
cover. These rules are complex and contain numerous exceptions. The last large
category of Medicaid recipients is those who are deemed “medically needy.” The
medically needy are people who are aged, blind or disabled, but who, despite having
incomes above the low threshold for categorical eligibility, have medical costs that they
simply cannot absorb. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, § 14.02[4]. Medically needy
recipients have enough income that they are not categorically needy. However, they
must “spend down” their income by using virtually all of that income to pay for the
cost of their medical expenses. Medicaid will then pick up the rest of the costs. Id.
44. Many people enter nursing homes as private pay residents, but exhaust all of
their assets and wind up relying on Medicaid to cover the costs of their long term care.
FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 14, § 14.01[1].
45. Id.
46. Home and community-based services were available for Medicaid-eligible
individuals who would otherwise need nursing home care if the state opted to offer that
option since 1981. Pub. L. 97-35, Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 357; 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.300310 (2010) (permitting states to offer home and community-based services to
individuals under a Medicaid waiver program). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.9102
(West 2010) (establishing a long term care program for the state of Florida); FLA.
ADMIN. RULE 69O-157.201 (2009) (approving standards for Long-Term Care
Partnership Program); ALA. ADMIN. RULE NO. 560-X-10-.01 (2009) (defining long
term care provisions for Alabama residents).
47. See, e.g., Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593-94 (1999)
(describing a claim in which the plaintiff alleged that the State placed her in a
segregated institution rather than a community based rehabilitation program despite her
desire to live independently).
48. Until recently, states operated HCBS programs under a waiver. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1915(c) (1981) (permitting states to operate HCBS programs under a waiver of
statutory requirements); 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.300-10(2010) (outlining requirements for
obtaining a waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 1915(c)). See generally Andrew I. Batavia, A
Right to Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated Setting Appropriate”
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many offer case management, homemaker services, adult day care, respite
care, or home health aides to assist the recipient under what is called the
“Agency” or “Medical” Model.49 Agency model services usually include
the assistance of a long term care worker employed by a private home
health agency that contracted with Medicaid to provide the service.
Significantly, the agency is the aide’s employer and sets the caretaker’s
hours, terms and conditions of employment, and is responsible for training,
hiring, and firing the aide(s). Caretakers under most HCBS waiver
programs must be supervised by a Registered Nurse, and may not be
legally liable family members of the participant, which means that they
may not be the spouse or parent of the recipient.50
Although many Medicaid beneficiaries are satisfied with their agencybased HCBS experience, two significant problems arose with the service
delivery model: concerns about beneficiary autonomy and a shortage of
labor. In the next sections I will explore each of these problems, and
discuss how consumer direction arose to address them.
1. HCBS Beneficiaries Lack Autonomy
Many beneficiaries complained that they lacked autonomy within the
HCBS system because they could not dictate when the aide would come to
assist them or with what activities they would assist them, and because they
had no way to insist that the aide provide services in a culturally
appropriate manner.51 In the agency model, the Medicaid beneficiary has
no control in the selection, training, directing, and firing of the person who
enters their home and performs what may be extremely intimate caretaking
tasks, including changing adult diapers, bathing, and feeding. While a
recipient may complain about a particular aide, it is up to the agency to fire
and replace the aide. The recipient does not control the aide’s working
hours, which may result in a mismatch. For example, an aide may work a
full eight-hour day, providing care from nine until five. However, the
recipient may require assistance getting into bed. The aide might need to
put the recipient to bed at five in the afternoon, before she leaves for the
evening. Other aides may not be attentive to religious or culturally
Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J.L. &
MED. 17, 24-25 (2001) (explaining the process under which states can apply for a
federal waiver to supply HCBS services under the Medicaid Program).
49. Batavia, supra note 48, at 21.
50. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.167(a)(2) (2010) (restricting payments to legally liable
family members under Medicaid HCBS programs); LAURA BATES, MICHIGAN FAMILY
IMPACT SEMINARS, MICHIGAN PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT FAMILY CAREGIVERS 26, 29
(2005), http://familyimpactseminars.org/s_mifis09c04.pdf.
51. See Marshall B. Kapp, Enhancing Autonomy and Choice in Selecting and
Directing Long-Term Care Services, 4 ELDER L.J. 55 (1996) (arguing that patients lack
control over services in traditional HCBS programs).
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determined needs of the recipient—such as the desire of the recipient to
keep her kitchen kosher or eat halal meat.
2. HCBS Programs Lack Adequate Labor Supply
The second major problem that arose in the Medicaid HCBS programs is
a dire shortage of paraprofessional home-based long term care workers at
all skill levels.52 In 2008, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that
1.5 million workers were employed as personal and home health aides. In
2000, the Office of Disability, Aging and Long-Term Care Policy
estimated that the “direct care workforce” provided care to at least fifteen
million people.53 The number of workers will have to increase by fortyeight percent, or at least one million more workers by 2014.54 The
paraprofessional health care worker shortage has serious consequences for
families as well as the person with disabilities. For example, in a 2000
study, forty-six percent of parents with a child eligible for home health
services could not find adequate workers or services for their child.55
Agencies that contract to provide Medicaid-funded long term care
workers suffer from the severe labor shortage, especially for recipients who
52. I use the term paraprofessional long term care workers to include people
working under a variety of occupational titles or descriptions. These include home
health aide, home care worker, personal services assistant, and direct-care worker,
among others. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recognizes two broad categories of
paraprofessional health care workers who are likely to work in private homes. Home
Health Aides “provide routine, personal healthcare, such as bathing, dressing, or
grooming, to elderly, convalescent, or disabled persons in the home of patients or in a
residential facility.”
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, HOME HEALTH AIDES (2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes311011.htm. The Department of Labor defines
personal and home care aides as workers who “help people who are disabled,
chronically ill, or cognitively impaired and older adults who . . . live in their homes or
in residential facilities instead of in health facilities or institutions.” Duties include
basic housekeeping tasks such as making a bed and keeping the home sanitary and safe
for the client. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, HOME HEALTH AIDES AND PERSONAL AND
HOME CARE AIDES (2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos326.htm.
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE FUTURE SUPPLY OF LONG
TERM CARE WORKERS IN RELATION TO THE AGING BABY BOOM GENERATION (2003),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/04cfpk02.htm#note1 (indicating that
12.1 million people received long term care, including 6.4 million people aged 65 years
or over and 5.7 million people aged under 65 years).
54. See JUTTA ULRICH, THE U.S. DIRECT CARE WORKFORCE—AN OVERVIEW 2
(2007),
available
at
https://www.azdes.gov/CMS400Min/uploadedFiles/
DAAS/direct_care_workforce_united_states.pdf (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics
data).
55. See LESLIE FOSTER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE
EFFECTS OF CASH AND COUNSELING ON THE PRIMARY INFORMAL CAREGIVERS OF
CHILDREN WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 6 (2005), available at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org/resources/20060120-105320/ddkidpic.pdf
(explaining that forty-six percent of parents were either dissatisfied with services or
needed services but could not obtain them).
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live in rural or high crime areas, live in communities with poor public
transportation, do not speak English, or need care outside of normal
working hours.56 Agencies suffer from an extremely high rate of aide
turnover.57 The problem is especially acute in federally funded long term
care programs, because they cannot rely upon the labor of undocumented
immigrants, who provide an unknown but significant portion of the low
wage labor in the private long term care market.
Unfortunately, there is not much to draw new workers into a career in
long term care, and the prospects for improving the employment outlook
are poor. Wages are low, and benefits nearly non-existent.58 The work can
be difficult and dangerous. There is close to no regulation or employment
protection, not even a guarantee of minimum wages or maximum work
hours.59
Despite the severe labor shortage, wages have resisted the laws of supply
and demand and remained stagnant over the past decade. In 2007, the
inflation-adjusted median hourly wage for all direct care workers was
$10.48. Inflation adjusted wages for home care workers have actually
declined to under $8.00 per hour.60 Thirty-six percent of home health care
workers are uninsured.61 Forty-one percent of all home care workers live
in households receiving public benefits like Medicaid, Food Stamps, child
care, energy, or transportation assistance.62
Racially-coded gender stereotypes play a strong role in keeping wages
low and working conditions poor. As a subset of domestic workers, long
term care workers suffer from being too far inside the private (feminine)
sphere to be regulated. Long term care work, like other work inside the
56. See id. at 10 (surveying parents of children with special needs eligible for inhome long term care).
57. See generally CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, supra note 13, at 12-15
(describing the turnover rates as high as one hundred percent).
58. See id. at 1-2.
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2010) (exempting companionship workers from wage
and hour protection).
60. See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., WHO ARE DIRECT-CARE
WORKERS?
(2010),
available
at
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/
l_art_det.jsp?res_id=299610. If employed full time, year round, the median annual
earning for a home health aide was approximately $20,000, while a personal and home
care aide earned $18,480. Id. However, only fifty-seven percent of direct care workers
are employed full time, while forty-three percent are employed part time or only part of
the year. Id. Fifty-four percent of personal and home care aides worked part time or
for only part of the year. Id.
61. Id. at 3. Only half of personal and home care aides have employer-based health
coverage. Many of the remaining home care workers likely receive their health
coverage through Medicaid. Id.
62. Forty-five percent live in households under two hundred percent of the federal
poverty line and fifteen percent live under one hundred percent of the federal poverty
line. Id. at 2.
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home, is not perceived as productive work; it is not work that enriches
capital.63 Long term care workers perform “emotional work” that is
underpaid because, like in other female-dominated professions such as
teaching or child care, the work is supposed to carry its own rewards.64
Further, in the past there was a perception that domestic work was
temporary, easy, and less dangerous than other types of female
employment, especially for white women who worked only until marriage.
Popular perception placed white domestics safely inside the private sphere
of the household, rather than in the rough and tumble public sphere of the
market.65
On the other hand, when domestic workers are not white, they are
perceived as too far outside of the regularized workforce to merit full labor
and employment protection. During the New Deal, domestic service
became increasingly associated across the country with women of color, in
particular Black women.66 Currently, the paraprofessional home care work
force is made up largely of women of color. Approximately ninety percent
or more of direct care workers (including those in institutional as well as
home-based settings) are female.67 Approximately thirty percent are
63. See Peggie R. Smith, Aging and Caring in the Home: Regulating Paid
Domesticity in the Twenty-First Century, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1835, 1839 (2006)
[hereinafter Smith, Aging and Caring].
64. See generally Aihwa Ong, The Gender and Labor Politics of Postmodernity, 20
ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 279, 286-89 (1991) (describing how gender inequality is
perpetuated when women are expected to accept lower wages for stereotypically
feminine jobs which involve a great deal of caretaking activity in addition to other
tasks).
65. Notwithstanding this historical perception, private homes are not necessarily
safe places for workers. Domestic workers experience high rates of violence and
harassment in in-home settings. See METROPOLITAN ACTION COMMITTEE ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN & CHILDREN, DOMESTIC WORKERS & LIVE-IN CAREGIVERS
EXPERIENCING WORKPLACE SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT 4 (2008), available
at http://www.owjn.org/owjn_2009/Images/pdfs/Domestic%20Workers.pdf.
66. Smith argues that the sharply declining rates of white women in domestic
service during the period of the New Deal, meant that “structuring domestic service as
a regulated employment relationship on behalf of Black women received limited public
support.” Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 63, at 1857. She notes:
There was little concern that they too would shun domestic service for
alternative job opportunities, given that “state-sanctioned discrimination not
only precluded them from making inroads into an increasing number of
occupations available to white women but also routed them into domestic
service.” Racial and regional politics strongly influenced the question of
whether New Deal labor legislation should extend to domestic service workers.
As various scholars have concluded, the decision to exclude them hinged on a
Southern agenda bent on maintaining a cheap labor supply and preserving the
status quo of white domination.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. In contrast, approximately fifty-six percent of the entire U.S. workforce is
female. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
195
tbl.2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat2.pdf; CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, supra note 13, at
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African American and fifteen percent either of Hispanic origin or other
workers of color.68 Twenty percent of the home care workforce speaks a
language other than English in the home.69
Depending on the client, paraprofessional home care work can be
extremely demanding. Paraprofessional home care workers suffer from
much higher than average rates of workplace injury, higher in some regards
than stereotypically dangerous settings such as coal mines and steel mills.70
Home health workers must lift patients unassisted and often do not have
control over their working environments, which leads to a greater risk of
injury than their nursing home counterparts.71
Exclusions of long term care workers from basic labor and employment
regulation reinforce the low status, poor wages, and dangerous working
conditions of this vulnerable workforce.72 The Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) explicitly exempts from minimum wage and maximum hours
rules “any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide
companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity)
are unable to care for themselves . . . .”73 They are also excluded from the
10.
68. See CITIZENS FOR LONG TERM CARE, supra note 13, at 10; see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-750T, NURSING WORKFORCE: RECRUITMENT AND
RETENTION OF NURSES AND NURSE AIDES IS A GROWING CONCERN 22 tbl.2 (2001),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01750t.pdf.
69. See Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 63, at 1848.
70. See id., at 1884-85 (noting that risk of injury among home care workers is
greater than that of nursing home workers).
71. See PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., HEALTH CARE FOR HEALTH CARE
WORKERS, THE INVISIBLE CARE GAP: CAREGIVERS WITHOUT HEALTH COVERAGE 3
(2008), available at http://hchcw.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/phi-cps-report.pdf;
PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., HEALTH CARE FOR HEALTH CARE WORKERS,
FACT SHEET: MICHIGAN, CAREGIVERS WITHOUT HEALTH CARE (2006), available at
http://hchcw.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/hchcw-fact-sheet-mi.pdf.
72. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2010) (exempting companionship workers from wage
and hour protection); see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158,
162 (2007) (confirming that companionship workers are exempt from wage and hour
protection under FLSA); Charles P. Sabatino & Dr. Simi Litvak, Liability Issues
Affecting Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Services—Report and
Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 289 (1996) (describing how home care workers
are unprotected by various labor and employment laws); Hila Shamir, Between Home
and Work: Assessing the Distributive Effects of Employment Law in Markets of Care,
30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 404 (forthcoming 2010) (describing how home care
workers are unprotected by various labor and employment laws); Smith, Aging and
Caring, supra note 63, at 1860 (describing how home care workers are unprotected by
labor and employment law).
73. Over the years, domestic service, including the work of nannies and
housekeepers, has gradually come under minimal federal labor and employment law
protection. Since 1974, most domestic workers have been protected by the federal
minimum wage, and most domestic workers who do not live-in are protected by
maximum hour rules. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2006). However, while the general
gradual trend has been towards increased coverage of domestic workers in general,
home-based care workers remain almost completely outside of federal wage and hour
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National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which protects the rights of
workers to engage in collective bargaining.74 Home care workers
employed directly by families or who work for small agencies are not
covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)75 or Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).76 State Workers’ Compensation
statutes do not cover many home-based long term care workers.77
3. Consumer Directed Long Term Care in the Medicaid Home and
Community Based Programs Increases Both the Pool of Available Long
Term Care Workers and Consumer Autonomy
“Consumer directed long term care” is a type of HCBS program
designed to mitigate the labor shortage and autonomy concerns associated
with agency-based home health care.78 Consumer direction in Medicaidprotection. Long term care workers provide “companionship services” and are thus
exempt from coverage. Id. Companionship services include:
fellowship, care, and protection for a person who, because of advanced age or
physical or mental infirmity, cannot care for his or her own needs. Such
services may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm
person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other
similar services. They may also include the performance of general household
work: provided, however, that such work is incidental, i.e., does not exceed 20
percent of the total weekly hours worked . . . .
29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2010) (exempting companionship workers from wage and hour
protection) (emphasis added). The FLSA exempts from coverage paraprofessional
home health workers, even though workers in the most closely analogous category,
“babysitters,” are exempt from coverage only if they work on a “casual” basis. That is
to say, “casual” babysitters are exempt from coverage, but paraprofessional babysitters
(such as nannies) are covered by the statute. In contrast, paraprofessional home health
workers are exempt from coverage, even when they are not employed on a “causal”
basis. Smith, Aging and Caring, supra note 63, at 1862.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (excluding individuals employed in the domestic
service of any family or person at his home or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse from employee status for purposes of the NLRA). See generally Shamir, supra
note 72 (stating that all “in-home care workers are excluded from the coverage of the
NLRA”).
75. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(b)(ii) (2010) (excluding the employees of
businesses with under 50 workers from FMLA coverage).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (excluding employees of businesses with
under 15 workers from Title VII).
77. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351(d) (West 2009) (excluding employees who
provide personal services from Worker’s Compensation coverage); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
440.02(17)(1)(1) (West 2010) (providing that domestic servants in private homes are
not covered under Workers’ Compensation Statutes); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-36
(West 2010) (not extending Workers’ Compensation to domestic servants or household
employees unless specifically covered under a homeowners policy).
78. See 73 FED. REG. 57854, 57855 (Oct. 3, 2008) (defining self-directed care as “a
service delivery mechanism that empowers individuals with the opportunity to select,
direct, and manage their needed services and supports identified in an individualized
service plan and budget plan”). Goals of consumer directed programs include the
following:
[d]elay or avoid institutional or other high cost out-of-home placement by
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funded long term care “represents a major paradigm shift in the delivery of
publicly funded home and community-based services.”79 Instead of having
a Medicaid contracting agency organize and oversee long term care
services, the beneficiary receives a stipend to purchase his or her own care
on the private market.80 A popularized alternative name for consumer
directed long term care is “Cash and Counseling.” As this name suggests,
the program has two basic components. Essentially, these programs are a
cash allocation to elderly persons or persons with disabilities, which the
recipient can use to purchase goods or services related to long-term care,
coupled with some assistance from the state, or counseling, in managing
their services.
Consumer directed long term care programs are spreading across the
country.81 In 2005, Congress created the statutory authority for states to

Id.

strengthening supports to individuals or families; [r]ecognize the essential role
of the individual or family in the planning and purchasing of health care
supports and services by providing individual or family control over an agreed
upon resource amount; [e]ncourage cost effective decision-making in the
purchase of supports and services; [i]ncrease individual or family satisfaction
through the promotion of self-direction, control, and choice . . . ; [p]romote
solutions to the problem of worker availability; [p]rovide supports including
financial management services to support and sustain individuals or families as
they direct their own services; [a]ssist States with meeting their legal
obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision; and [p]rovide flexibility for States
seeking to increase the opportunities afforded individuals and families in
deciding how best to enlist or sustain home and community services.

79. JANET O’KEEFFE, CASH AND COUNSELING, IMPLEMENTING SELF-DIRECTION
PROGRAMS WITH FLEXIBLE INDIVIDUAL BUDGETS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASH
AND
COUNSELING
REPLICATION
STATES
i
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org/resources/20090202101712/CCReplicationReport_f
inal.pdf. Over the past twenty years there have been a bewildering array of attempts by
states to implement self-directed models for the provision of Medicaid or state-funded
long term care. See, e.g., DIANE BRAUNSTEIN, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, STATEFUNDED HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICE PROGRAMS (2001), available at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/031901SERVICEPROG.pdf; see also PAMELA DOTY &
SUSAN FLANAGAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HIGHLIGHTS: INVENTORY
OF
CONSUMER-DIRECTED
SUPPORT
PROGRAMS
(2002),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/highlght.htm (detailing 139 programs offering
consumer directed home and community-based support services nationwide as of
2002).
80. This kind of program goes by many names, including consumer directed long
term care, Self-Directed Long Term Care, Cash and Counseling, and Consumer
Directed Personal Assistance Services (“CD-PAS”). Each of these reflects ideological
choices about the program. Because this article focuses on the use of the term
“consumer” to describe the user of services, I will use “consumer directed long term
care.”
81. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded pilot programs to study “Cash
and Counseling” implementation in Alabama, Florida, and New Jersey. BARBARA
PHILLIPS ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., LESSONS FROM THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CASH AND COUNSELING IN ARKANSAS, FLORIDA AND NEW JERSEY
iv (2003), available at http://www.cashandcounseling.org/resources/20051202163649/Gsswltc%20sharedcashandcounseling.orgLibrary%20ResourceImplementation
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provide “self-directed personal assistance services” in their Medicaid State
Plans without requiring an additional Medicaid waiver.82 The Department
of Human Services (“DHS”) anticipates that additional states will add selfdirected programs to their Medicaid State Plans in the near future. The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, popularly known as “Health
Care Reform” in 2010, created additional monies and incentives for states
to implement consumer direction in long term care.83
The cash component gives recipients the “budget authority” to manage
the government funds used for their long term care.84 In the Medicaid
program, there are limits to the freedom granted to the participants. Unlike
other cash public benefits, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (“TANF”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), states
impose restrictions on the goods and services the recipient can purchase
with state funds. Each expense must be planned for and approved in
advance. Examples of typically allowed expenditures include hiring of a
personal care assistant, housekeeper, or companion, making home
modifications, obtaining transportation services, or purchasing prepared
meals or other goods and services. Participants in demonstration studies of
consumer directed long term care purchased items like ramps, lift chairs,
3states.pdf. It later provided funding and research support for eleven more states to
develop programs under the new waiver templates. In 2004, an additional twelve states
implemented replication projects to follow up on the Cash and Counseling
demonstration models. Although the programs in the United States are unique in
several regards, there is a worldwide trend towards adoption of consumer directed long
term care programs. See generally MICHAEL FINE, A CARING SOCIETY? CARE AND THE
DILEMMAS OF HUMAN SERVICES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2006).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j) (2006); 73 FED. REG. 57854, 57855 (Oct. 3, 2008)
(defining self-directed care as “a service delivery mechanism that empowers
individuals with the opportunity to select, direct, and manage their needed services and
supports identified in an individualized service plan and budget plan”).
83. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, PUB. L. NO. 111-148
(2010). The 2010 Health Care Reform legislation included two reforms of particular
relevance to this article. The Community First Choice Option will provide incentives
to states to amend their HCBS state plans to provide community-based attendant
services and supports. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(k) (2006 & Supp. 2010). The Community
Living Assistance Services and Support Act (“CLASS Act”) establishes a new national
voluntary insurance program for purchasing community living assistance services and
support. 42 U.S.C. § 30011 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
84. In keeping with the philosophy of consumer direction, beneficiaries are
presumed capable of handling many of these obligations. Some early commentators
expressed concerns about the ability of beneficiaries to complete these tasks.
Beneficiaries may designate a personal representative to assist them with these tasks.
The demonstration studies generally noted that many beneficiaries could manage their
obligations and planning, and that those who felt that they could not or did not want to
opt to have a representative (usually a family member) assist them. RANDALL BROWN
ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., CASH & COUNSELING: IMPROVING THE
LIVES OF MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES WHO NEED PERSONAL CARE OR HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED
SERVICES
36
(2007),
available
at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/0807casfinalcrosscutting.pdf. This assistance is, of
course, unremunerated care by a family member.
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and microwave ovens, although the low amount of the benefit often limited
the purchases they could make.85
Participants spend the vast majority of funds under these programs to
pay for caretakers to help them with meals, personal care, shopping, and
the like. Along with the “budget authority,” many of these programs
transfer “employer authority” over caretakers to the recipient.86 Caretakers
do not need to work for an agency to provide home health services.
Because the participant does not go through an agency to hire caretakers,
he or she is responsible for the hiring, firing, and training of workers.
The second component to these programs is the “counseling” element.
While the consumer direction model is premised on the idea that that the
elderly and persons with disabilities are capable of directing their own care,
program administrators have come to recognize that not all participants
have the skills needed to manage budgets, the obligations of an employer,
or long-term financial planning. States offer varying forms of support in
locating, selecting, training, and paying vendors.87
III. CONSUMER DIRECTION EXPANDS THE LABOR POOL FOR MEDICAID
HOME AND COMMUNITY BASED SERVICES BY COMMODIFYING FAMILY
LABOR
Under consumer direction, the consumer is responsible for locating his
or her own long term care workers—freeing the state from this obligation.
Importantly, many consumer directed long term care programs explicitly
allow participants to hire relatives, even those such as parents or spouses
who are already legally obligated to provide support.88 While there have
85. See generally BARBARA PHILLIPS & BARBARA SCHNEIDER, MATHEMATICA
POLICY RESEARCH, INC., ENABLING PERSONAL PREFERENCE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CASH AND COUNSELING DEMONSTRATION IN NEW JERSEY 72 (2003), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/enableppes.htm.
86. O’KEEFFE, supra note 79, at i. Additionally, caregivers in most cases do not
need to be supervised by a Registered Nurse, as is usually the case in agency-based
home health care. See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, NURSING CARE QUALITY
ASSURANCE
COMM’N,
CAREGIVER’S
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/professions/nursing/Caregiver_FAQ.htm (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
87. Assistance can range from giving basic information about hiring an assistant to
serving (or contracting with a vendor to serve) as the fiscal agent, and processing the
caretaker’s payroll, including withholding. The state or state contractor in its role as
fiscal agent will typically cut the checks to pay the vendors or service providers. The
cash and counseling states all provide fiscal services (in some cases for a fee) to handle
payroll and withholding for caretaker employees. In New Jersey, for example, one of
the original Cash and Counseling Demonstration states, not one participant requested to
be their own fiscal agent for purposes of payroll and withholding. See PHILLIPS &
SCHNEIDER, supra note 85, at 93.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(4)(B) (2006) (stipulating that under a self-directed
plan, an individual is permitted to hire individual(s) to assist in providing such services
and may hire any individual capable of providing such tasks, including legally liable
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been a number of state-funded programs that have allowed payment to
legally liable family members, in general this has not been the norm and
was not allowed under previous Medicaid regulations.89 States do not have
to enact this option, but it appears that many will.90 This new legally liable
caretaker rule represents a major shift in law relating to caretaking and
support.91
The option to hire a worker without going through an agency has a
specific effect: demonstration studies of experimental consumer directed
programs show that the majority of beneficiaries hire members of their own
families.92 Consumer direction increases the labor supply by tapping into
the labor of friends and family members who are unlikely to work for a
home health agency but who may be willing to care for a relative with a
disability. It may also bring into the system a small portion of family
caretakers who are already providing care without being paid.93 It is
important to note that consumer direction increases the labor supply by
tapping into new pools of labor rather than improving wages and working
conditions to make the profession more attractive. On the contrary, it has
negative effects on the workforce, which I will discuss in detail in Section
IV.
Putting aside for the moment concerns about the specific effects on labor
force, the commodification of family labor alone is significant, as it is
largely unprecedented in American social policy.
Organizations
representing family caretakers have been advocating for many years to
allow family members to receive payment for providing long term care.94
relatives).
89. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.167(a)(2) (2010) (restricting payments to legally liable
family members under Medicaid HCBS programs).
90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.221 (West 2010) (providing payment for care
provided by family member).
91. Under the common law, contracts for wages for housework by a spouse were
unenforceable. Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the
Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (1996). The principle has remained intact in a range of
modern cases, from prenuptial agreements to contracts to provide care in exchange for
consideration in a will. It also presumes, at least in the case of spouses, that housework
could not constitute consideration because it was already presumed as part of the
marital relationship. While this might not apply to parents of minor children, the
principle reflects an understanding that caregiving labor is a component of kinship and
relationship, rather than a form of productive labor. Id.
92. BROWN ET AL., supra note 84, at 36.
93. Program administrators initially expressed concerns about a potential for the
“woodwork” effect. See, e.g., Briana Bunn, A New Class of Employees: Family
Members Aiding the Disabled, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 505, 506 (2006). There has
been little evidence of people signing up for Medicaid simply to gain access to
consumer direction monies for their unpaid family caretakers. BROWN ET AL., supra
note 84, at 36. However, in some cases, there is evidence of family caretakers turning
some of their unpaid work into paid labor through the program. Id.
94. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 7 (arguing that financial compensation
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Some feminist theorists have advocated for the commodification of care
work in general, highlighting its significance to the economy and
emphasizing that housework and care work are indeed work.95 The move
not only to allow the state to pay family members to provide care, but also
to create a system in which this does not require that the family member
become an employee of a home health agency, is both welcome and long
overdue.96
The significance of transforming family members and friends into paid
home based care workers under Consumer Directed Care cannot be
understated . . . . Traditional agencies may struggle to hire enough aides
to meet demand. Hiring family and friends taps a source of assistance
usually unavailable to traditional agencies . . . . Analysis of interview
data for Arkansas indicates that the treatment group members were much
more likely than control group members to receive paid care. This
finding is consistent with tapping the “labor supply” of family and
friends.97

On the other hand, by using quotation marks around the term “labor
supply” of family and friends in the above quote, the author telegraphs the
general discomfort with conceiving family as a labor supply or care work
as something that family members could or should commodify.98 Keeping
in mind that consumer directed long term care would not function without
the infusion of family labor, the authors of the demonstration summary
note, “[I]n all three of the Cash and Counseling programs, consumers had
difficulty hiring a worker if they did not have a relative or friend to hire.”99
In Arkansas, for example, after nine months in the program, sixty-six
percent of participants who had hired a paid caretaker, reported that they
had hired a relative.100 These relatives were likely not people available to
provide care through an agency; they were “new” paraprofessional homebased care workers. Only fifteen percent of Florida caretakers for adults
reported not knowing the “consumer” prior to being hired to care for them,
while in New Jersey, this figure was ten percent, and in Arkansas was as
to family caretakers helps strengthen care because it provides more resources to be
used for care of the recipient).
95. See, e.g., Clare Ungerson, Social Politics and the Commodification of Care, 4
SOC. POL. 362, 362 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Bunn, supra note 93, at 505 (arguing for increased payment to family
members who care for persons with disabilities).
97. BROWN ET AL., supra note 84, at 36.
98. On feminist debates regarding commodification, see generally RETHINKING
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE 271-302 (Martha M.
Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
99. PHILLIPS ET AL., supra note 81, at 18.
100. CASH AND COUNSELING DATA AND ANALYSIS SYSTEM, MATHEMATICA POLICY
RESEARCH,
ARKANSAS
NINE
MONTH
DATA
(2005),
http://198.87.1.54/default.asp?go=Interactive%20Analysis.
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low as five percent.101 Within this group, the proportion of caretakers who
were family members was also strikingly high. In Florida, fifty-eight
percent of paid caretakers for adults were family members.102 In New
Jersey, this figure rose to seventy percent, while in Arkansas, a full
seventy-eight percent of paid caretakers were related to the “consumer.”103
This is in stark contrast to the agency-based control group, which reported
that less than five percent of paid caretakers were related to the Medicaid
beneficiaries or provided unpaid care to them prior to the demonstration in
all three states.104
Proponents of consumer directed long term care also point to two
additional benefits provided by tapping into the family and friend labor
pool that may or may not be met through the current system of agencybased home health care: increased supply of culturally sensitive or
appropriate care105 and increased supply of care in hard-to-serve locations
or non-traditional hours.106 Eighty-three percent of consumers of selfdirected care in Arkansas, for example, reported that they were satisfied
with their caretaker’s schedule, as opposed to only sixty-nine percent in the
agency-based control group.107 In Arkansas and New Jersey, non-elderly
consumers were more likely than the control group to receive personal care
assistance during non-working hours (weekdays before 8:00 a.m. or after
6:00 p.m. or on weekends).108

101. STACY DALE ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., EXPERIENCES OF
WORKERS HIRED UNDER CASH AND COUNSELING: FINDINGS FROM ARKANSAS, FLORIDA
AND
NEW
JERSEY
12
tbl.1
(2005),
available
at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/workerexp.pdf.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 11.
105. Georgia Burke & Katharine Hsaio, Older Women of Color and the Challenge
of Regulating Cultural Competence, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 27, 36 (May/June 2009)
(noting that good implementation of self-directed delivery options under Medicaid
personal services would “tackle the issues of language, cultural competence . . .”). In
this article I do not address whether Medicaid beneficiaries using consumer directed
funds to hire workers either can or should be able to discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, religion or gender in the name of finding a culturally competent aide. These
are thorny questions which deserve more space than I can dedicate to them in this
article.
106. NATHAN L. LINSK ET AL., WAGES FOR CARING: COMPENSATING FAMILY CARE
OF THE ELDERLY 191 (1992).
107. LESLIE FOSTER ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, INC., EFFECT OF
CONSUMER DIRECTION ON ADULTS’ PERSONAL CARE AND WELL-BEING IN ARKANSAS,
NEW
JERSEY
AND
FLORIDA
41
(2005),
available
at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/adultpcw.htm.
108. Id. at 38 tbl.21.
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IV. CONSUMER DIRECTION INCREASES AUTONOMY IN LONG TERM CARE,
BUT AT WHAT COST?
Even though the labor shortage is the most pressing issue in long term
care, it is not the problem most cited when discussing the need for long
term care reform. The most significant political argument for consumer
direction is the lack of autonomy in agency-based HCBS programs. But,
autonomy is a slippery concept that bears exploring in the context of long
term care. Upon closer examination, we can see that there are different
neoliberal and progressive iterations of autonomy operating in the rhetoric
underlying consumer direction. In this case, they come together in a single
policy discourse to make this program appealing to most of the American
political spectrum.
In the first version, which resonates with neoliberal economists and
policymakers, lack of autonomy creates a learned helplessness in which the
passive beneficiary depends upon the “nanny state” to send aid. This
version assumes an obliviousness to cost on the part of the beneficiary,
which, in a fiscally conservative frame, leads to overuse of the resources.109
In the second iteration, which resonates strongly with a human rights-based
frame, a lack of autonomy results in a lack of control over basic bodily and
household functions. While a person may be living in her home, she is no
longer the mistress of her house.
Consumer direction purports to solve all of these problems by
eliminating the HCBS Agency and making the beneficiary the employer of
her aides. In the next two subsections I describe the two versions of
autonomy that are married in this program, and in each section I will
address the effects highlighted by each iteration of autonomy. I argue that
when the commodification of family labor (described above) meets these
autonomy discourses, the family caretakers and paraprofessional workers
become invisible, disembedded from their place in the regularized
workforce.
The power of the autonomy discourse distorts our
understanding of the relationship between caretaker and care recipient so
that we see it as disembedded from the lived reality of the people involved.
I argue that that any program for long term care that fails to address the
interests of the caretakers and the fundamentally relational nature of those
interests will remain unsustainable, trading the weaknesses and hidden
costs of the agency-model HCBS program for the new ones of consumer
direction.

109. See Batavia, supra note 48, at 21.
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A. Neoliberal Autonomy as Consumer Choice Obscures Our Dependence
on Both Family and State
Consumer directed long term care funded by Medicaid appears to be
something of an oxymoron: a neoliberal welfare program. In reality, it is a
political compromise between free market principles and the need to fill the
gap in long term care created by demographic pressures and the entrance of
most women into the paid labor force. In its purest form, neoliberalism
rejects exactly the kind of transfers inherent in consumer direction—the
forced redistribution of income tax-based general revenue funds, without
regard to efforts of the beneficiary to earn those benefits.110 However,
consumer direction is an expression of a softer version of neoliberal
ideology termed the “ownership society,” which libertarian thinkers
promoted during the presidency of George W. Bush.111 By replacing the
regulation-heavy (not to mention expensive) nursing-home model with one
that plays to the rhetoric of individual choice and limited budgets,
consumer directed long term care manages to appear to be a conservative
answer to the pressing social welfare problem of an aging population.
In this ideological compromise, the state provides social welfare
benefits, but people enact a performance of autonomous consumption of
the benefit rather than behaving as passive beneficiaries.112 The state
expects Medicaid beneficiaries to manage their benefits as though they
were private goods in the free market, using allotted benefits to maximize
their own self-interest. Because the consumer is looking out for him or
herself, there is no need for state regulation for quality.113 Finally, the risks
of success and failure are borne entirely by the “consumer” of the benefit.
In this, consumer directed long term care is the sibling of efforts to
privatize Social Security,114 impose consumer direction in health care,115
and provide school vouchers.116
110. See Rojhat B. Avsar, A Critique of ‘Neoliberal Autonomy’: The Rhetoric of
Ownership Society, 37 F. FOR SOC. ECONOMICS 125, 128 (2008) (citing F.A. HAYEK,
THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 295 (1978)).
111. Id. See also DAVID BOAZ, CATO INSTITUTE, THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM:
TAKING ON THE LEFT, THE RIGHT AND THREATS TO OUR LIBERTIES 27 (2008).
112. See FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 39; MARSHALL B. KAPP, THE LAW AND OLDER
PERSONS: IS GERIATRIC JURISPRUDENCE THERAPEUTIC? 98 (2001); Avsar, supra note
110, at 128.
113. See Marshall B. Kapp, Ninny Clients of the Nanny State? Selective Paternalism
in Public Benefits Programs for Older Americans, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 193
(2008) (arguing that consumer direction will result in a need for less quality
regulation).
114. Avsar, supra note 110, at 128; KAPP, supra note 113, at 158.
115. MargaretAnn Cross, Consumer-Directed Health Care: Too Good to be True?,
MANAGED CARE, September 2003, available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/
archives/0309/0309.cdhc_main.html.
116. See generally KAPP, supra note 113, at 109 (pointing to consumer direction in
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A number of Medicaid consumer directed long term care programs
pointedly and deliberately use the term “consumer” rather than
“beneficiary.”117 This creates a powerful framework that hides the meanstested nature of the program. In the “ownership society,” market
participants, those who own and control their retirement portfolios, homes,
and small businesses, reign supreme.118 As one commentator notes with
regard to long term care services,
[i]n the purchase of any products or services, ordinarily the important
operational details (the who, what, when, where, and how specifications)
of financing, handling, and delivery are largely within the control of
whoever is paying the bills. When an individual product purchaser or
service recipient personally pays, that person is respected as a consumer
and economically empowered to negotiate the specifics of the
transaction, at least to the degree that there exists a competitive
marketplace of product and service merchants seeking business in the
individual’s geographical location.119

In contrast, of course, is agency-based HCBS or institutional model long
term care, in which the beneficiary is a passive recipient. In Agency model
contexts, the state sends out an aide to provide care at the time and pay rate
that the state and aide negotiate. Because he or she receives care, but not
choice about that care, the beneficiary exists in a realm outside of the
marketplace. The moral hazard and learned helplessness created by
government planning and oversight of long term care diminishes the
fundamental status of the elderly and persons with disabilities as full
members of the polity.120
Transforming the beneficiary into an active consumer (putting aside the
fact that the state is giving them the money in the form of a need-based
welfare benefit) restores them to full citizenship. Consumers are rights
bearing social citizens, inasmuch as they now possess individual property
and, by extension, individual property rights.121 Capitalism has no role for
long term care as part of a general trend which should also include consumer direction
in other social programs).
117. See, e.g., ROBERT APPLEBAUM & IAN M. NELSON, EVALUATION OF THE CASH
AND
COUNSELING
PROGRAM
IN
ILLINOIS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org/resources/20090311140801/EvaluationoftheCashan
dCounselingPrograminIllinois.pdf; FLORIDA DEP’T OF ELDER AFFAIRS, CONSUMERDIRECTED CARE PLUS, available at http://www.cdcplus.org/docs/brochure.pdf (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010); IOWA DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DEVELOPING CHOICES,
EMPOWERING IOWANS (2006), available at http://www.cashandcounseling.org/
resources/20060113-144803/IowaFAQ.doc.
118. See Avsar, supra note 110, at 128.
119. KAPP, supra note 113, at 193 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 217.
121. See FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 15; Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a Theory of
Human Rights, 27 SOCIOLOGY 489, 492 (1993).
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the elderly and people with disabilities. They are non-productive. But,
perhaps by making them consumers, consumer direction salvages or
perhaps even creates a role for them. This framing reflects a market-based
culture and recognizes that in the United States our power as consumers is
perhaps more significant than other forms of collective or political
action.122 This frame has some compelling elements to it, not least of
which is a vision of the elderly and persons with disabilities as full-fledged
members of society, receiving care with which they are satisfied.
1. Autonomy as consumer choice pits the interests of the consumer against
the interests of their family member caretakers
On the other hand, the neoliberal autonomy rhetoric masks that the vast
majority of beneficiaries are receiving care with which they are satisfied
because they are receiving care from their friends and family, not
necessarily because they are suddenly “autonomous.” It is not that they are
making choices from a vast array of potential sources of care. For the most
part, consumers who did not have a friend or family member to take care of
them could not participate in the program.123 It is not their autonomy that
creates the satisfaction—on the contrary, it is their interdependence that
creates the satisfaction.
If beneficiaries are satisfied, why should we care about the rhetoric
surrounding the program? Because the neoliberal vision of autonomy as
consumption hides something else—it undermines the very
interdependence that the elderly and persons with disabilities enjoy. It
points to a weakness in neoliberal ideology in general, which is that
neoliberalism generally fails to appreciate that markets are embedded in
social relations.124
A social citizenship premised only upon our ability to purchase services
in the free market presents a very impoverished vision of community.125
Neoliberalism pretends that, as a rational consumer, the beneficiary is free
to ignore the potentially negative costs to either the other person at the end
of this supposedly arm’s length transition or society. Acting like a rational
consumer means maximizing benefits and limiting costs. In the context of
a fixed stipend it means one thing very clearly—keeping wages as low as
possible.

122. See generally ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE 7 (2005) (arguing that
the power of consumers and the logic of consumption is replacing formal political
processes in a way that is potentially deeply undemocratic).
123. BROWN ET AL., supra note 84, at 95.
124. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Amereon Ltd 1999) (1944).
125. See ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM 5, 7 (2007).
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What does an emphasis on keeping wages as low as possible mean in a
situation in which a person hires a family member to provide care for
them? It means that we are pretending that the interests of the consumer
and the interests of the worker can be severed from each other and treated
as oppositional. It means that we can imagine an arms-length transaction
with a person who is accepting the position not only for wages, but
possibly in part out of love and/or obligation. It leads to seeing the two as
entirely separate, rather than as inexorably linked.126 It elides how the
relationship between caretaker and care recipient is just that: a relationship
between real people with histories and futures and with shared economic
interests. Economic reductionism also elides the love that some people feel
for each other, the deep sorrow at the illness of a loved one, the
extraordinary burden disability can place upon a family. It buries the guilt
or negativity or exhaustion that are almost inevitable in caretaking
relationships. It hides how the economic life of the family is inseparable
from its emotional life.
2. Autonomy as consumer choice allows the state to shed its role as both
regulator and employer
Autonomy expressed as consumer choice reduces the role of the state.
The consumer, not the state, is the employer of record for all purposes
under such a program. The state collects taxes and then acts only as a
fiscal agent, cutting checks and ensuring paperwork is filed.127 Whether
this is viewed as a positive or negative development is entirely normative;
it depends on how we conceptualize what the proper role of the state is in
these specific circumstances.
The reduction of state control in the day-to-day delivery of long term
care might reduce bureaucratic interference with tasks that implicate
intimate bodily functions of the beneficiary.128 For example, if the
beneficiary controls the working hours of the worker, then he or she can
make choices about which services they provide and which they ask others
to assist them with or handle on their own. This might lead to a caretaker
providing services highly valued to the beneficiary but which are less based
126. This is reminiscent of attitudes towards pregnant women. See Dawn Johnsen,
A New Threat to Pregnant Women’s Autonomy, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 33, 36
(August/September 1987).
127. See BARBARA PHILIPS & BARBARA SCHNEIDER, MATHEMATICA POLICY
RESEARCH, INC., CHANGING TO CONSUMER-DIRECTED CARE: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE CASH AND COUNSELING DEMONSTRATION IN FLORIDA 75 (2004), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/.
128. See Deborah Stone, For Love nor Money: The Commodification of Care, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra
note 28, at 271 (arguing that the bureaucratization of care disrupts the caretakerreceiver relationship).
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on medical needs than would be allowed under the agency model. For
example, a beneficiary could decide that having an aide take him or her to a
weekly church service is more important to them than assistance with
bathing.
On the other hand, decreased state control over care is linked in the
American legal system with decreased state regulation over all aspects of
the caretaker-care receiver relationship. If the state is no longer the
employer, it does not bear liability for abuse of the beneficiary or
responsibility to monitor quality of care.129 In the free market, the
consumer should simply choose another caretaker if the care offered by one
is inadequate.130
If the state is no longer the employer, it also sheds its responsibility to
protect the worker, in more ways than one. First, the state itself is no
longer a party to the transaction and therefore cannot be held to have
violated labor and employment laws with regard to the worker.131 More
insidious is that consumer direction shifts the workers from being
employees of an agency (likely an entity that employs enough workers to
bring them under the coverage of many federal labor and employment
laws) to being workers employed in private homes by individuals (who are
much less well protected). As a result, paraprofessional workers who work
in consumer directed settings will lose a number of fundamental workplace
protections the state affords agency workers, thus making the workers even
more vulnerable than before. For example, although agency-based long
term care workers are generally (albeit poorly) protected by occupational
health and safety regulation, those employed by a private individual in a
home are not covered at all.132 Many state workers’ compensation statutes
do not cover workers employed in private households, while many cover
domestic workers employed by an agency.133 Some state minimum wage
and maximum hour laws cover agency-based long term care workers, while
those same state laws may not cover workers employed in private homes.134
129. Sabatino & Litvak, supra note 72, at 258. Thank you to Ann Shalleck for
pointing out that any costs for preventing or punishing neglect or abuse are then buried
in the Adult Protective or Criminal Justice systems.
130. See KAPP, supra note 113, at 192.
131. See Sabatino & Litvak, supra note 72, at 258-60.
132. See 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (2010) (exempting domestic workers in private homes
from coverage under Occupational Health and Safety Act). See also Peggie R. Smith,
Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Consumer-Directed Home Care for the
Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 537, 549-50 (2007) [hereinafter
Smith, Home Sweet Home?].
133. Smith, Home Sweet Home?, supra note 132, at 549.
134. See, e.g., KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.650 (2010) (stipulating that domestic
workers or companionship workers employed in a private home would not be covered
by Workman’s Compensation Statutes, but yet the same workers would be covered by
such laws if they were employed by an agency).
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Workers in private homes also lose coverage under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1965, the FMLA, and the FLSA.135 This means that antidiscrimination laws do not protect them and they do not have a federally
protected right to unpaid family or medical leave and do not have a right to
unionize.
Family members who serve as consumer directed long term care workers
find themselves with even fewer protections. For example, even in states
where long term care workers employed by an individual are covered by
workers’ compensation, a family member might be excluded from
coverage, even though they run the same high risks of on-the-job injury as
other workers.136 Parents and spouses are not eligible to receive
unemployment compensation if their family member lays them off.137
Family member workers may not be eligible for state disability
programs.138
B. Autonomy Creates a Positive Human Right for Beneficiaries, but it
Disembeds Long Term Care Workers from the Regular Workforce
Despite its emphasis on market-based solutions, reduction of the role of
the state and the power of the consumer, consumer direction is not
exclusively a neoliberal concept. On the contrary, the original demand for
autonomy in long term care emerged out of the movement for the civil and
human rights of persons with disabilities.139 As Ruth Lister notes,
135. 29 U.S.C. § 28-2601(2)(B)(2) (2006) (covering only employees who work for
an employer with 50 or more employees within 75 miles of the worksite under the
FMLA); 29 U.S.C. § 206(f) (2006) (denying domestic workers the same minimum
wage protections as other employees); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (exempting domestic
workers from maximum hour protections); 42 U.S.C. § 21-2000e(b) (2006) (covering
only employees who work for an employer who has over fifteen employees under Title
VII).
136. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-212(4) (2010) (exempting members of an
employers family from Workman’s Compensation, if desired); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §
2.6 (2010) (exempting employers with fewer than five employees from workers’
compensation scheme).
137. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 383-7(f)(20) (2010) (excluding family member
employees from unemployment insurance coverage). While it might sound odd, there
are numerous scenarios in which one might be “laid off” by a family member. For
example, the beneficiary might lose Medicaid coverage or move to a nursing home, a
child with a disability might start to receive school-based services, or a beneficiary
might pass away.
138. See, e.g., id. § 392-5 (denying state disability benefits to family member
employees).
139. The pressure initially arose out the disability rights movement. Because the
elderly and persons with disabilities both receive long term care from the Medicaid
program, there is a considerable amount of cross-pollination between the movements in
the United States. However, the movements are distinct, and may represent different
interests in other contexts. For more on the emerging international movement for civil
and human rights of elderly persons, see generally Diego Rodriguez-Pinzon & Claudia
Martin, The International Human Rights Status of Elderly Persons, 18 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 915 (2003).
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“[A]ccording to the independent living movement, independence stems
from the ability to control the assistance required. The dependence that
results from the lack of such control is . . . corrosive of disabled people’s
rights as citizens.”140 Autonomy then moves beyond a negative right to be
free from state interference, which fits into the neoliberal human rights
paradigm, into the much more progressive territory of positive rights.141 In
a positive rights paradigm, the state should give persons with disabilities
the resources to exercise autonomy because individual self-determination is
a human right, not because their consumer behavior will lead to better
outcomes. For example, the new U.N. Convention on Rights of the
Disabled (which the U.S. has signed but not ratified) specifically lays out
the right to “have access to a range of in-home, residential and other
community support services, including personal assistance necessary to
support living and inclusion in the community, and to prevent isolation and
segregation from the community.”142 The declaration of a right to “have
access” presumes a measure of state involvement in providing the
resources.143
The United States started to move in this direction even prior to the
signing of any international treaty to that effect. Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Olmstead v. L.C., requires the government to provide publiclyfunded long term care services “in the most integrated setting appropriate
to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”144 Under Olmstead,
home and community-based settings must be made available to Medicaid
beneficiaries whenever reasonable.
The disability rights movement extended this line of reasoning, arguing
that living independently in home and community-based programs requires

140. Ruth Lister, Justice, Equality and Dependency: A Critical Social Policy
Perspective, Presented at Symposium on Nancy Fraser’s Work (Mar. 22, 2003),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/sociology/rsw/researchcentres/gender/news/pastev
ents/symposium/lister.
141. See CHAVA WILLIG LEVY, RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. OF INDEPENDENT
LIVING, UNIV. OF KANSAS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE INDEPENDENT LIVING
MOVEMENT 6 (1988), available at
http://www.independentliving.org/
docs5/ILhistory.html; see also World Institute on Disability, Timeline of the
International Independent Living Movement, http://www.wid.org/programs/
international/timeline-of-the-international-independent-living-movement-1 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2010).
142. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N.
GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106, art. 19 (Dec. 6, 2006).
143. See Samuel Bageustos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 79
(2004).
144. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 592, 596 (1999) (quoting C.F.R. §
35.130(d) (2010)).
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consumer direction.145 This framing proved successful. When the federal
government finally allowed experimentation with consumer direction on a
large scale (as part of the Bush Administration’s Independence Plus waiver
program) policy makers made implicit reference to the positive right to
supports for autonomy by invoking the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the Olmstead decision in the “goals” of the program.146
The autonomy discourse of the movement for independent living is
powerful and persuasive. However, it contains within it a paradox that
highlights why autonomy is ultimately a poor frame for long term care
policy. Consumer directed long term care, by pulling so heavily on
autonomy-as-individual-self-determination, blinds us to the people on the
other side of the equation. An autonomy paradigm—even one deeply
rooted in human rights—that rests on a system in which women of color
and family caretakers receive wages and benefits so low that they
themselves are eligible for public benefits, with little or no health and
safety regulation despite dangerous working conditions, is ultimately not
rooted in social justice. As Fineman writes, “[B]y relying on the myth of
the autonomous individual, the formal equality model fails to address
substantive inequalities and differential allocations of privilege produced
by our institutions.”147 Neoliberals can at least pretend that low wages and
poor working conditions are irrelevant in a supposed free market for labor.
After all, no one is forcing people to work in long term care. But, for a
progressive movement based in human and civil rights principles, ignoring
the worker on the other side of the equation should not be possible.148
Much like we cannot countenance a feminism blind to the injustices of race
and class, I argue that we should not ground a movement for the rights of
persons with disabilities in the exploitation of others, especially when those
others are overwhelmingly low-income women of color and low-income
female family members of all races.
The elimination of the agency as employer of record for even some long
145. See Batavia, supra note 48, at 19 (arguing that a “more integrated setting”
requires consumer direction, like that available to persons who can purchase services
on the private market); see also Andrew Batavia, The Growing Prominence of
Independent Living and Consumer Direction as Principles in Long Term Care: A
Content Analysis and Implications for Elderly People with Disabilities, 10 ELDER L.J.
263, 264-65, 267 (2002) (stating that consumer direction has proven a highly
satisfactory model in various studies); United Nations Enable, Declarations and
Reservations, available at http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=475 (last
visited July 30, 2010) (listing the declarations of various countries that give persons
with disabilities presumption of legal capacity and ability to choose their own care).
146. 73 FED. REG. 57854, 57855 (Oct. 3, 2008).
147. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 19 (2008).
148. JENNIFER PARKS, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HOME HEALTH
CARE 93, 97-111 (2003).
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term care workers has consequences for all long term care workers which
should be of particular concern for civil and human rights advocates. I
divide these effects into two categories, which I will discuss in turn. First,
consumer direction will freeze the low wages and poor benefits of
paraprofessional long term care workers by reducing the ability to organize
for better wages and by creating disincentives for family member workers
to seek better wages for themselves. Second, the family members who
undertake care work, even when paid under consumer direction, incur
opportunity costs not captured in the wages paid by the program. In the
long run, this diminishes the capabilities of the caretakers.
1. Consumer direction makes organizing and collective bargaining in long
term care more difficult
Consumer directed long term care, by having the beneficiary serve as the
sole employer, undercuts one of the only mechanisms low wage workers
have for improving their working conditions: unionization. While
unionization is not not without complicated politics, agency or public
authority-based care workers in state Medicaid programs have had some
success by unionizing. When they have done so, they have achieved higher
wages and improved working conditions.149 For example, workers
represented by SEIU Health Care Michigan recently won a $.50/hour raise,
despite the poor economic climate. As the union’s website noted, “this is
the third raise home care workers have won since uniting together in SEIU
and most workers have seen their pay rate rise by nearly [forty percent].”150
Importantly, in a number of places, unionized workers have bargained for
health insurance coverage and other benefits.151 They have also used their
resources to oppose cuts in long term care funding and their political clout
to agitate for long term care reform.152
Under the consumer directed model, collective bargaining by long term
care workers is much more difficult. First, the NLRA excludes domestic
149. See Howard S. Berliner et al., Health Care Workers Unions and Health
Insurance: The 1199 Story, 31 INT’L J. OF HEALTH SERVICES 279, 281 (2001); Kristin
Jenkins Gerrick, An Inquiry into Unionizing Home Healthcare Workers: Benefits for
Workers and Patients, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 117, 128 (2003) (outlining both benefits and
challenges posed by unionization of home care workers).
150. Service Employees International Union, Home Care Workers Win Raise!,
http://www.seiuhealthcaremi.org/hcw/Default.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
151. See Service Employees International Union, About SEIU UHW,
http://www.seiu-uhw.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010); Service Employees
International Union, As National Bargaining for 100,000 Union Members at Kaiser
Permanente Begins . . . SEIU Members Tell Kaiser: Keep Your Hands Off Our
Healthcare Benefits (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.seiu-uhw.org/2010/04/as-nationalbargaining-for-100000-union-members-at-kaiser-permanente-beginsseiu-uhwmembers-tell-kai.html.
152. Berliner et al., supra note 149, at 283-85.
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workers employed by a “family or person at his home.”153 This means that
workers employed by a beneficiary have no right to bargain collectively for
better working conditions or higher wages, though all of the funds used to
pay for their wages comes from a single source, the state’s Medicaid
program.154
Even without the legal impediments, collective bargaining would be
unlikely under consumer direction. First, under consumer direction, the
beneficiary, not the government entity, sets the wages and any other
benefits. There is no central employer to set uniform wages, and so
collective bargaining is not useful. Further, the presence of large numbers
of friends and family members (even if they were not a majority of care
workers) creates a sub-set of workers who are very unlikely to be interested
in unionizing the field. Because they are interested in working for only one
beneficiary, and not staying in the care work field long term, they are
unlikely to see themselves as having a stake in the long term care
workforce or in the field more generally. While those workers might
engage in advocacy on behalf of his or her friend or family member, and
perhaps even for increased long term care funding overall, it is unlikely that
they have the kind of “intentionality” about the choice of long term care as
a career that would propel them to collective action with other workers. In
fact, these workers may be unlikely to think of themselves as professionals
at all, instead seeing their work as an extension of their caretaking
obligations for which they receive a small remuneration. While these
workers are vital to the beneficiary they care for and to the functioning of
the system as a whole, their presence decreases the effectiveness of one of
the only tools workers have for raising the wages and improving working
conditions enough to make the profession more attractive.
In the end, the move from agency as employer to beneficiary as
employer may harm beneficiaries as well as workers by reducing the
supply of paraprofessional long term care workers. Paraprofessional long
term care workers who work for agencies already suffer from poor working
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (excluding any individual employed in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by
his parent or spouse from coverage under the NLRA). See generally Smith, Aging and
Caring, supra note 63, at 1873-75 (describing the domestic worker exclusion).
154. The ability to select a worker alone, however, does not have to be fatal to
workers’ ability to unionize. California has for many years allowed some beneficiaries
to select their own workers under the state’s Medicaid home health program. Workers
circumvented the lack of NLRB protection by lobbying for the creation of public
authorities which serve as the employers of record for purposes of collective bargaining
for wages and benefits. Several unions represent workers across the state, including
those employed under the quasi self-directed model. However, in California, the
program is not fully self-directed, in that the county sets caretaker wages and the
number of hours of care, not the individual beneficiaries. See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 12306.1 (2010) (setting wage and hour rules for home health care workers
under California’s Medicaid program).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

35

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8

706

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

conditions and low wages. These conditions are exacerbated when the
beneficiary is the employer, and the worker loses almost all labor,
employment and health and safety protection.
Absent collective
bargaining, it is difficult to see how long term care workers will ever
achieve the wage increases needed to make the field attractive enough to a
sufficient number of documented workers to solve the long term care
worker shortage.
2. The commodification of family labor carries opportunity costs for the
worker
At a practical level, consumer directed long term care can function as
wage replacement for family caretakers who opt to take payment to provide
care instead of participating in the regular labor force. In this scenario, the
program brings in more money to the family unit, which was otherwise
losing the opportunity to earn income by providing the care. Supporters of
lifting the legally liable relative ban point to the lost wages of family
members who provide unpaid care work instead of engaging in paid
labor.155
The benefits of a wage-replacement scenario are most likely to emerge in
cases involving care by legally liable relatives, such as parents or spouses,
who might otherwise work outside the home. Many parents who have
children with significant special needs find that working outside of the
home is logistically impossible and thus suffer a direct loss of income as
the result of having at least one wage-earner in the house occupied in
caring for the child with a disability, rather than bringing income into the
house.156 The replacement of wages is likely to be especially significant for
low-income single parents, who find it impossible to live on the meager
benefits offered by SSI, but who cannot hold down traditional employment
due to their child’s needs. The parent/spouse worker will also pay Federal
Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) taxes, thus receiving Social Security
credit for the years they provide paid care.157
There are other intangible reasons why a family member might decide to
receive payment for the care rather than hire an outside aide. For example,
the increased flexibility and ability to direct the care of a child with a
disability might decrease conflicts that can arise between the interests of
children with special needs and their parents or other family members. It
155. Lori Simon-Rusinowitz et al., Payments to Families Who Provide Care: An
Option That Should Be Available, 22 GENERATIONS 69, 71-72 (Fall 1998).
156. See SLOAN WORK AND FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK PANEL MEETING, supra
note 30, at 3.
157. See I.R.C. § 3306 (2006) (requiring workers who are the parent or spouse of an
employer to pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act taxes if they are over 21 years of
age).
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might just be simpler, which as anyone who has had to juggle and schedule
multiple aides to care for a family member will say is no small benefit.
The parent or spouse would not have to manage the paperwork for an
outside worker or locate, hire, train, or fire the worker. Some family
members might appreciate additional time with the disabled or elderly
family member. Certainly in the case of mothers staying home to take care
of their own children, they are conforming to cultural expectations of good
mothering in that they are caring for their child, rather than hiring another
person to do so.
Finally, parents and spouses might worry less about the quality of care
they can provide. While quality of family caretaking versus care by
another person will differ from case to case, a parent might worry much
less about the quality of care he or she provides. In extreme cases, the
parents might not be able to find another suitable caretaker, and at least
receiving payment for caring is better than having no caretaker and no
other employment. This is most likely to be true for the hardest to serve
families, who are more likely to be non-English speaking, care for a person
with severe disabilities or live in rural or high crime areas or regions
without public transportation.
For example, in its Cash and Counseling Demonstration project, Florida
allowed parents to receive payment for the care they provided for their
children with developmental disabilities so long as that care was beyond
the care typically provided a child of the same age.158 In the demonstration
study, about twenty percent of primary caretakers opted to become paid
caretakers through the program.159 While the reasons for choosing this
option differ for each family, it appears that opting to become a paid
caretaker correlated very strongly with two factors: unmet need for care
prior to enrolling in the program and higher benefit levels.160 The
caretakers who opted to be paid for their caretaking were also less likely to
be married, perhaps indicating that another wage earner was not available
in the household.161 For some families, the level of disability was

158. FOSTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 3. The children enrolled in the program were
between 3-17 years old and qualified on the basis of need as well as a diagnosis of low
intelligence quotient, cognitive disability, autism, spina bifida, cerebral palsy, or
Prader-Willi syndrome, as well as limitations in their ability to self-care. Id.
159. Id. at 17. It is also worth noting that thirty-eight percent of parents reported
that the primary reason they did not become paid caretakers is that they did not know
this option was available to them under the program. Id. at 18.
160. Id. Caretakers who reported that their child was not getting enough help with
personal care at baseline were 2.58 times more likely to become paid caretakers. Id. at
33 tbl.C.4. Caretakers of children who had benefits of $500 or more per week were 3.4
times more likely to become paid caretakers than those who had children who received
benefits of under $150 per week. Id.
161. See id. at 18.
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sufficiently high that caring for the child was intensive (and thus likely to
disrupt other paid employment), they could not find another satisfactory
care worker and/or the wages earned by the family caretaker were enough
to make a difference to the family. Both the paid and unpaid caretakers in
the demonstration study reported increased satisfaction with their child’s
care and their own lives, but these effects were even greater for the paid
family member caretakers.
The implications of the policy change for some extremely vulnerable
families might be positive in the short term, as they are able to care for
their children or spouse while still bringing in income to the family.162
However, there are also significant negative consequences for the worker.
The transfer of sole employer responsibility to the beneficiary places
legally liable relatives in an even worse position than other workers in what
is already a low wage, low benefit job.
Like many other long term care workers, nuclear family member
workers will not receive a paid vacation. However, the effects of this may
be more pronounced for nuclear family member workers who live in the
same home and are likely providing unpaid care as well. This might turn
an already overwhelming job into literally around the clock care, with no
weekends, vacations or respite. There is nothing to stop a beneficiary from
hiring more than one worker, thus providing respite for their family
member caretaker. However, given the complexities of hiring even one
worker and the desire to keep what little monies the benefits provide in the
family, it is possible that this will not be an option for many families.
Also worth considering are the less tangible, but in the long term
possibly more important, opportunity costs lost to a person who gives up
outside paid employment to provide care, even if that care is minimally
paid. Although some observers have argued that paying nuclear family
members for their care work makes up for at least some of the opportunity
cost of providing care,163 I argue that the wage alone may not sufficiently
account for the entire opportunity cost to the family member worker. It also
is important to note here that these opportunity costs are borne almost
exclusively by women, and in particular by women who are already lowincome.
What are the opportunity costs not covered by the wages provided to the
162. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 54 (arguing that a reallocation of
economic help to caretaking units, along with structural support, would allow for those
who “work for wages and work for either love or duty do not have to compromise one
to do the other”).
163. See, e.g., Lori Simon-Rusinowitz et al., Payments to Families Who Provide
Care: An Option That Should Be Available, 22 GENERATIONS 69, 71-72 (Fall 1998),
available
at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org/resources/20051202155025/paymentstofamiliesgenerations.pdf.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/8

38

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Kraiem: Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy, Commodif

2011]

CONSUMER DIRECTION IN MEDICAID LONG TERM CARE

709

caretaker? Family caretakers are likely missing the opportunity to work in
a field of their choosing, build a résumé, climb a career ladder, and develop
their skills and potential. In a way, a concern for the needs and desires of
the family member worker turns the autonomy argument on its head. The
“autonomy” of the beneficiary results in a reduction in opportunity to
develop the capabilities of the caretaker.164 For family member caretakers,
working in long term care is not a chosen career.165 They are caring for a
specific individual (their child or spouse) and are not engaged in the
intentional career development that could lead from low-wage long term
care work to higher wage work in the medical or another related field. This
has significant class implications, as a low wage earning woman is more
likely to find the option of paid care work more attractive than a woman
who has the potential to earn more than minimum wage.166
Barriers to re-entry in the workforce in any field other than long term
care work would likely be the same as though the family member had not
been compensated for her work. “I was home caring for my severely
disabled child” or “My elderly mother needed me” is not a résumé builder,
especially if the break in paid employment is for more than a few years.
High earning women suffer a thirty-seven percent loss of “earning power”
if they take three years off from work.167 There is little reason to believe
that the loss of long term earning power would be any different for women
who took a low wage job as a care provider for a family member.
Consumer direction transforms family care work from unpaid labor into
poorly paid labor. We have commodified, but continue to undervalue, the
work. These may indeed be families who cannot get adequate care
otherwise, who might benefit from the infusion of extra cash into the
household, and who would certainly welcome the reduced hassle and worry
about hiring care workers. However, the same families, the least resilient,
need the most investment in their future over the long haul. These families
need to locate and be able to remain in jobs with health benefits, vacation
time, and sick leave. Parents who care for children with severe disabilities
who may require care over their entire lifetime may find themselves
choosing between long term planning and short term survival. While being
very helpful in the short term, the payment of wages for care work does
164. See Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 161 (arguing that women who leave
paid employment to be caretakers, even temporarily, are often “locked into a lower
socioeconomic status throughout their lives”).
165. See id. (emphasizing the need for caregiver choice and agency).
166. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 7 (“[I]n a study of determinants of home
care use, frail older people with high-earning adult children received less unpaid care
from their offspring and more care from paid sources than those whose children has
worse labor market prospects.”).
167. Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck Luce, Off-Ramps and On-Ramps:
Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. 43, 46 (2005).
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little to increase the long term resilience of the family and may leave them
even more vulnerable in the end.
V. GROUNDING CONSUMER DIRECTED LONG TERM CARE IN COMMUNITY
RESILIENCE RATHER THAN AUTONOMY
Whether the caretaker family member benefits from the arrangement or
not, constructing consumer directed long term care around the principle of
“autonomy” carries steep costs. If nothing else, the consumer direction
demonstration projects show us that, for many people, there is no such
thing as an “autonomy” that does not account for people’s position inside
of families. Market-based solutions that emphasize the need for each
individual to invent her or his own solution to the challenge of aging or
disability are inadequate to the task of simultaneously solving the crisis of
labor, the need for self-determination, the sustainability of the entire system
of long term care, and the impact that care work has on the people who
provide care.
What would happen if instead we started to understand the “market” for
long term care as one that is embedded in social relations? If the discourse
around autonomy creates overly narrow boundaries for understanding how
to provide for inevitable aging and disability, then what discourse in the
United States might open up new spaces, ones in which the dignity of the
beneficiaries are unified with a sustainable framework for the caretakers?
One conceptual frame worth exploring is that of community resilience.168
Framing the question of long term care as one of community resiliency
might provide a way out of the false dichotomy between of the needs of the
“consumers” of care and of the “providers” of care created by the
autonomy discourse. In this section, I take up the question of how we
might use the resources of the state to create the community resiliency that
will enable families and communities not only to rise to the challenges
created by the need to care for vulnerable members, but also to become
stronger as a result.
Resiliency, like autonomy, is often framed in individual terms.169
Enhancing resiliency, for example, may be framed as providing a person
with reeducation so that he or she can meet the challenges of earning a
living in a changing economy. Thinking about resiliency in this way
168. I began to explore resilience in response to a call for participation for an Emory
Law School Feminism and Legal Theory Project workshop, organized in March 2010
around the theme of resilience. I thank Martha Fineman and the other organizers for
allowing me to participate in that forum and for their helpful feedback.
169. See Rachel Davis et al., A Community Resilience Approach to Reducing Ethnic
and Racial Disparities in Health, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2168, 2169 (2005) (noting
that most approaches to eliminating health disparities focus on individuals rather than
on communities).
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presents community as nothing more than a collection of atomized
individuals, each of whom is struggling alone to meet his or her own needs.
This vision of community resembles something more of a marketplace,
where individual actors (“market participants”) compete.
Resilient
individuals find ways to meet their needs, while less resilient and less
competitive individuals in this community do not. Differential outcomes,
while unfortunate for the losers, are fair as long as each individual is free to
participate and choose how he or she will participate in the same
marketplace. When we think of community in this way, we give little
attention to how winners and losers are connected to each other and fail to
consider how resiliency is fundamentally relational.
More recently, “community resiliency” (as opposed to an individual
resiliency) has started to make its way as a concept from ecology to the
social sciences. Community resilience is the ability of communities to
thrive despite the presence of risk and change.170 This conception of
community resilience is rapidly taking hold in the field of sustainable
development, especially with regard to the capacity of communities to
withstand climate change and natural disasters.171 It also recognizes that all
communities, and all persons within those communities, are vulnerable.172
Martha Fineman writes that “[U]nderstood as a state of constant possibility
of harm, vulnerability cannot be hidden. Further, while institutions such as
the family may provide some shelter, they are unable to eliminate
individual vulnerability and are themselves vulnerable structures
susceptible to harm and change.”173
The immense social change created by the full transition to a capitalist
labor market, with its need for a mobile labor force, the entry of women
into the paid labor force, increasing longevity, and the large size of the
baby boom generation places immense pressures—a social climate
change—on both families and the state as they try to meet the need for long
term care. Aging, disability, and increased wage labor are not disasters.174
170. David Godschalk, Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities, 4 NAT.
HAZARDS REV. 136, 137 (2003) (defining a resilient city as one that can sustain
networks of physical and human systems that can survive breakdowns, change, and
external influences).
171. See, e.g., ATIQ AHMED, US AID/ASIA, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES OF
“RESILIENCE”: A COMPILATION FROM VARIOUS SECONDARY SOURCES 19 (2006).
172. See Fineman, supra note 147, at 11.
173. Id.
174. As Nancy Hooyman and Judith Gonyea note,
a feminist analysis challenges the status quo and stresses the absolute necessity
of changes in social institutions, attitudes and values to improve women’s
lives. Accordingly, feminists do not define demographic and social changes,
such as the growth in the percent of the older population or the large-scale
entry of women in the paid labor market as “problems.” Instead a feminist

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

41

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8

712

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

But, they do present immediate challenges that create stress on a system
and a need to reallocate resources within a community while often
engendering change. All of these forces together create a need for resilient
caretaking communities that can adapt in the face of change while retaining
their essential character and continuing to perform their valuable functions.
Resiliency and autonomy do not operate in opposition. Being embedded
in a resilient family or community should not mean that an individual does
not have choices within that context or even the choice to leave that
context. Two important components of community resiliency are diversity
and redundancy, both of which operate to create more choice.175 The more
resilient various community structures are, the more options an individual
might have for having his or her needs met. Real autonomy, then, is the
ability to make more than one choice.
Systems with multiple nodes are less likely to fail because the failure of
one component does not cause the entire system to fail.176 In the context of
long term care, this means having more than one option for long term care
and not expecting any single structure to meet all needs. Creating diversity
and redundancy dictates that we look to multiple, local forms of care rather
than a one-size-fits-all solution. This supports, rather than reduces,
autonomy in the long run. It also can serve to diffuse the work of long term
care, and, if designed specifically to do so, counteract the tendency of long
term care systems to rely so heavily on the unpaid or low paid work of
women.
For the purposes of this Article, I only consider how community
resilience might be a useful concept in consumer directed long term care.177
I propose that by placing three principles at the heart of any program for
home-based long term care, we will start creating the kind of community
resilience required to meet the demands for long term care. As a threshold
matter, long term care programs must re-embed the elderly and people with
disabilities in family and community. Second, long term care programs
must re-embed paid caretakers within the labor market and protect the
interests of unremunerated caretakers. And finally, programs should
emphasize social cohesion by broadening the definition of the caretaking
community and recognizing that civil society can complement the state, the
family, and the market in providing consumer-directed long term care. I
model is oriented toward fundamental systemic changes that accord greater
societal recognition of the work of caring and assure flexibility and choice for
both those who require care and those who provide it.
Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 151-52 (internal citations omitted).
175. Godschalk, supra note 170, at 141.
176. Id. at 140-41.
177. There are, of course, many other issues raised by this framing in the area of
long term care more generally, which I hope to see addressed in other projects.
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touch upon each of these briefly in turn, largely to provide direction for
future research in this area.
A. A Resilience Frame Embeds Long Term Care Consumers in Community
The first step in applying a community resiliency frame to consumer
directed long term care is to reposition caretakers and persons with
disabilities within a larger community. As an initial matter, we should stop
promoting policies that pit the interests of the beneficiaries against those of
the workers who care for them, because this framing hides the nature of
interdependence. If we conceptualize the caretaker-care receiver as a unit
(rather than a consumer and provider operating in opposition), we see that
supporting caretakers inures to the benefit of both.178 Further, if we see the
caretaker-care receiver relationship as one node in a complex system, then
we might begin to imagine a network of possibilities for supporting long
term care.
For example, in a community resiliency frame, we can more clearly see
the benefits of supporting family caretakers, even those paid for their work
under a consumer directed long term care program. Often it is the sheer
number of tasks—ranging from food to mobility to medical care—involved
in intensive long term care that overwhelm family caretakers. To borrow
another metaphor from ecology, families are overfished. Advocates for
family caretakers have been asking for years for increased respite
programs, assistance with transportation, and other services.179 New
federal funding may expand some of these programs, but advocates agree
that more support is needed.180
Step two would be to stop seeing caretaker-care receiver dyads as
independent units that operate in isolation. The supports that do go to
family caretakers now flow to individual caretakers, as though each
caretaker must reinvent the wheel of how to balance long term care needs
with the needs of other members of the family, in addition to work.181
Many programs focus on “‘individual solutions’ (i.e., if caretakers learn to
178. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 34, at 43.
179. See NAT’L FAMILY CAREGIVERS ASSOC., A FAMILY CAREGIVER SPEAKS UP: IT

DOESN’T
HAVE
TO
BE
THIS
HARD
(2007),
available
at
http://www.nfcacares.org/pdfs/caregiver_advocacy/family_friendly_caregiver_legisl.pd
f (identifying 15 bills that would improve the working and living conditions for
caregivers).
180. See Paula Span, In Obama’s Budget, Help for Caregivers, N.Y. TIMES, NEW
OLD AGE BLOG (Feb 3, 2010), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/inobamas-budget-help-for-caregivers/ (calling an investment of $102.5 million in
caretaker-related programs a “drop-in-the-bucket” when compared to the size of the
entire federal budget).
181. See Hooyman & Gonyea, supra note 8, at 157 (arguing in favor of a systemic
approach as opposed to an individual approach based solely in psycho-educational
interventions).
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operate more efficiently and become more skilled at coping, their stress
will be reduced) versus systemic change (i.e., the development of more
effective delivery models).”182 This model may even inadvertently
reinforce gender-based inequities in the allocation of caretaking, since their
focus is to “help caregivers adjust to unavoidable burdens.”183
If we stop thinking of people as atomized individuals who must solve the
dilemma of how to obtain care for themselves or thinking of families as
discrete units that must allocate the burdens of care within and between
their members, a number of new possibilities for state action to support
long term care come into focus. Caretakers who see themselves as part of a
community of people facing similar challenges might be more able to
suggest and advocate for collective solutions that address the underlying
structural forces that create caretaker stress. For example, the National
Association of Family Caregivers advocates for a number of policy
changes to better integrate family caretakers into the community, including:
integrating the concerns of family caretakers into federal health, long term
care, and social service policy-making; lowering the threshold for
deducting medical expenses; providing Social Security “credits” of deemed
wages for caretaking; allowing caretakers who lose heath insurance
because they leave the workforce to buy into group health; extending
COBRA for caretakers; allowing Medicare to pay for more of the supplies
often needed by the frail elderly; increased funding for respite care;
expanding paid and unpaid family medical leave; increased training; and
increasing support for care coordination.184
B. A Resilience Frame Re-embeds Caretakers in the Workforce
A focus on community resilience dictates that the labor practices that
underpin the entire long term care system must be sustainable. It weakens
the entire edifice if home health agencies, long term care institutions, and
individual consumers are constantly grappling with high turnover and lack
of continuity.
The state can support the long term care workforce, at least in the
consumer direction context, by re-assuming its responsibilities vis-à-vis the
workers. There are models for doing so without destroying what is
valuable about consumer direction—the ability to control the identity of
workers and their working hours and the hiring of willing family member
182. See id.
183. See id. (discussing how counseling interventions which focus on individual

behaviors as opposed to social structures may reinforce gendered notions regarding
caretaking).
184. NAT’L FAMILY CAREGIVERS ASSOC., PRINCIPLES, PLANS, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS (2009), available at http://www.thefamilycaregiver.org/pdfs/
0809policystatement.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L FAMILY CAREGIVERS ASSOC., PRINCIPLES].

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol19/iss2/8

44

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Kraiem: Consumer Direction in Medicaid Long Term Care: Autonomy, Commodif

2011]

CONSUMER DIRECTION IN MEDICAID LONG TERM CARE

715

workers. For example, California has moved to a public agency model in
which consumers self-direct their care, but the public agency serves as
employer of record for other purposes.185 This would bring home-based
long term care workers, including family member workers, under the
protection of many important federal and state employment laws, including
the FMLA186 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1965.187 Under such a
system, workers compensation coverage could also be made available, and
workers would be eligible for Unemployment and State Disability benefits
in a manner comparable to other workers in their State.
Having the state assume a regulatory role would not solve all of the legal
discrimination faced by long term care workers. Even long term care
workers employed by a public agency or other state entity are not covered
under the minimum wage and maximum hour rules under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. However, this is a relatively simple regulatory fix, and the
Department of Labor has already drafted (but never implemented) the
proposed regulations that would enable such a change. Likewise, Congress
could solve the lack of coverage under the federal NLRA.
More complex than simply bringing home-based long term care workers
on par with almost all other workers would be accounting for opportunity
costs borne disproportionately by female family members. Severing the
age-old connection between gender and caretaking will be challenging.
Raising wages and status can help, but likely only up to a point. The rest is
transformation of culture that cannot take shape so long as our current
conceptions of community, the relative value of work and gender-based
wage inequalities persist. It is naïve to think that we can overcome all of
that at once. It also elides the very real matter that most of the elderly are
women, and they may prefer a female caretaker over a male one for reasons
of modesty. However, like child rearing norms, norms about caring for the
elderly or persons with disabilities are not static, and the nagging effects of
gender inequality require our attention.
Ensuring that family member workers are compensated for all hours of
care, and providing sufficient remuneration so that workers can contribute
to their own retirement savings, health insurance, paid vacations, and
unemployment coverage might ameliorate some of the more concrete lost
opportunity costs. Family caretakers could also be offered training so that
they could translate their experience working with a family member into a
185. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12301.6 (West 2010) (establishing public
agencies as employers of record for In Home Supportive Services workers).
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(b)(ii) (2006) (excluding businesses with less than 50
employees from FMLA coverage).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006) (excluding businesses with less than 15
workers from Title VII coverage); see also NAT’L FAMILY CAREGIVERS ASSOC.,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 184.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011

45

KRAIEM 10/28/10

4/7/2011 2:10:19 PM

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 8

716

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 19:2

career in the nursing or medical profession either in conjunction with or
after their work as a family caretaker. While this would not appeal to all
family caretakers, there might be some who benefit greatly from the
opportunity, especially those low wage workers who might be able to later
obtain jobs in a rapidly growing field.
C. Supporting Resilient Caretaking Communities Strengthens Long Term
Care for Everyone
Broadening societal notions of who is responsible for long term care in a
community creates diversity and redundancy. This in turn supports
autonomy and resilience. Largely absent from discussions of consumer
directed long term care is the presence of civil society, or members of local
communities which could create diversity and redundancy in the system.
This does not need to be the case. There is nothing in consumer direction
that dictates reliance on only family, state, or private market. States that
offer a Medicaid consumer directed long term care option should consider
shoring up community involvement in long term care for several reasons.
First, families are not appropriate locations for care for all consumers, and
people who do not have sufficient family support often end up falling back
upon more expensive institutional care. Second, even for those who have
family care, it is often not enough. Finally, strengthening community
involvement in long term care will carry ancillary benefits to the entire
community.
Family care is not available to all for a variety of reasons. For some,
families are sites of violence and oppression. For other families, the work
of long term care may be more than they can or want to bear given the
other needs of their family members and the demands of work. Others live
far from their families. Further, placing responsibility within family
(especially without extensive community support) serves only to reinforce
the existing gender norms regarding who will provide what type of care.
Considering community resilience allows us to find a role for the state in
supporting community groups that fill the gaps left by families and the
private market. Religious groups and community groups can play an even
larger role than they do now to fill the niches where persons with
disabilities need support, but the private market and families cannot quite
meet the need. For example, consumers could opt to spend their long term
care stipends on services, such as errand running or shopping services,
rather than asking their paid aide or an unpaid family member to help with
these tasks.188 However, those services do not exist in many communities.
Thus, a role for the state might be to subsidize such a service or find other
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396t (2006) (including chore services within the list of
personal care services a consumer may choose as part of an HCBS program).
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ways to encourage community groups to create one. The private market
has created those services in some markets, but in others, state subsidy
might be required to seed them or ensure that they are available to all. In
another example, families with similar diets could pool consumer directed
long term care funds to hire a cook to provide culturally appropriate meals
for elders who live alone, which would eliminate a source of stress for
some beneficiaries who would otherwise be uncomfortable with a caretaker
from outside of their ethnic or religious community. Support of groups that
encourage social interaction, while not exactly “long term care” in the
traditional sense, create the kind of social support that enables people to go
on living independently for as long as possible. Finally, states should
consider ways to help people who do not have family members to locate
long term care workers, either by maintaining clearinghouses or lists.189
These supports also assist people outside of the Medicaid system with
long term care. There are numerous examples of community-cohesion
enhancing models for caring for the frail elderly and persons with
disabilities: walking scale neighborhoods; apartments with elevators in
them within walking distance of a park, library, community center, town
square, or school; public transit on demand; easy access to fresh foods and
healthy prepared meals; nearby basic medical facilities; community visits
by trained medical professionals for assessments. As proponents of
Universal Design point out, making changes to benefit people with
disabilities often benefits the entire community. The state can play a vital
role in seeding these kinds of improvements and projects, while
encouraging multiple, local and dynamic action by communities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Long term care touches upon deep questions about what it means to be
autonomous or resilient and what it means to live in a community.
Creating a just and sustainable system for providing long term care means
coming face to face with the heavily gendered nature of care work and the
race-based inequalities that pervade low wage long term care work. It
means addressing the multiple pressures on families who already provide
most of the care for their vulnerable members. It means confronting the
demographic changes that mean that more and more people will need long
term care in the coming years, while the pool of available labor remains
low. It means placing the dignity of persons with disability at the center of
the conversation without losing sight of the human rights of others.
I have mixed feelings about the turn toward consumer direction in long
189. See, e.g., CTR. OF MEDICAID & STATE OPERATIONS, STATE OF DELAWARE
ATTENDANT
SERVICES
WAIVER
APPLICATION,
available
at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2010).
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term care. On the one hand, I understand the connection between human
dignity and the ability to make basic decisions about one’s day-to-day
existence. Those decisions have to include some measure of control over
who touches our bodies, enters our homes and plays a vital role in our
lives. Consumer directed long term care recognizes that the elderly and
people with disabilities should have this control over their lives. Perhaps
even more importantly, it recognizes that they are capable of exercising it.
On the other hand, the move in the direction of vouchers in lieu of a
robust social welfare program is a part of a continuing trend to shed state
responsibility for provision of basic human needs. It is rooted in an attempt
to impose free market principles even though, given the extraordinary
amount of unpaid labor that is foundational to the system, there is no such
thing as an undistorted free market for long term care.
In this article, I have attempted to point to the specific legal and policy
consequences created by the switch from state-controlled in-home care to
consumer directed (but state-funded) care in the United States. My purpose
is to show how implementing policies that shift responsibility for arranging
care away from the state and toward the family and market has real
consequences for caretakers and the people who depend upon their care.
The consequences of moving to consumer direction include a loss of state
quality control oversight, elimination of even the most basic employment
protections, such as anti-discrimination laws and occupational health and
safety, disruption of the ability to access ordinary workplace protections,
such as unemployment or disability insurance, a destruction of any
potential for collective bargaining, and unaccounted for opportunity costs
for family member workers. The raced and gendered nature of these ill
effects cannot be ignored, as most of them fall upon the low-income
women of color who make up the long term care workforce, or upon
female family members who already bear the brunt of caretaking labor.
Because I support the basic dignitary interests of the elderly and people
with disabilities, and because I see how the ability to hire a family member
might benefit especially vulnerable families, I cannot reject consumer
direction out of hand. However, I also resist the market-based framework
that disembeds people from relationships and community and creates the
laundry list of negative consequences for workers and family members.
Since I can neither accept nor reject consumer direction entirely, I have
struggled to create a new framework for considering long term care that
preserves the dignitary aspects of consumer direction, while not forgetting
that people who need care are members of families and communities who
are affected by their actions. This is not a mere exercise in writing the
“solutions” section traditional to law review articles. It is a genuine, if
preliminary, attempt to reframe in-home long term care. Community
resilience, which I explore in this article, is one attempt at such a
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reframing; there may be other frames worth exploring. Instead of thinking
of long term care in a competing rights framework in which the caretaker is
pitted against the person who needs care, I challenge myself and others to
imagine a long term care system which increases community cohesion, that
reduces the stresses on families while retaining their vital economic and
affective functions, and that recognizes the dignity of both the people who
need care and the people who provide it.
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